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I. INTRODUCTION
Independence between advocates is a bedrock principle of the legal
profession. The fact that "independence" is woven into the welcome mat for
legal services is seen any time an unrepresented party is advised to seek
"independent counsel." Though legal ethical rules are designed to preclude
relationships between opposing advocates, the need to protect independence
has never been questioned and alternatives have never been proposed.
But what if strong, dependent relationships between opposing advocates
were fostered in certain situations? Consider small-town litigators who,
because they work across from each other on a continuing basis, are adept at
resolving cases amicably. With rises in population and urbanization, this
bygone attorney archetype is being replaced by big-city attorneys who are less
likely to work across from each other on multiple cases. It is well established
that a working relationship between opposing parties tends to foster
cooperation, trust, rapport, and creative outcomes. In fact, the perceived
decline in professionalism among attorneys in the last 50 years may be linked
to, if not entirely caused by, this shift in the legal landscape. These
observations call into question the dogma of absolute independence between
opposing attorneys.
However, the presumptive need for independence is most vulnerable
between non-legal advocates. Negotiation-focused advocates such as
collaborative lawyers perform many of the same functions as litigators but,
importantly, do not seek legal intervention. Should these non-legal advocates
be governed by the same ethical schemes as courtroom attorneys?
By exploring the reasons underlying ethical rules concerning
independence, this paper will identify the conditions in which independence is
necessary and, conversely, when independence between opposing advocates
is optional or even counterproductive. Part I provides a background to this
inquiry by showing that the application of binding law in an adversarial,
decision-based forum necessitates that attorneys operate independently of
each other. The strong link between independence and litigation calls into
question the need for independence between advocates who operate solely in
the context of negotiation and thereby outside the adversarial courtroom. Part
II follows this realization with an analysis that applies game theory to the
history of the American legal system to demonstrate that independence is
crucial to advocacy inside the courtroom but may be detrimental to advocacy
in other contexts. With the prior two sections delineating the appropriate
contexts for independence between opposing advocates, Part III proposes
"dependent advocacy" as a relationship among advocates that may be more
conducive to negotiation and collegiality. Though independent advocates
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retain the valuable function of advising clients of their legal rights and may
continue to be preferred by some disputants, people seeking the assistance of
an advocate currently only have the option of independent advocates and may
benefit from another option. The most basic application of dependent
advocacy is the negotiation-based advocate, already present in alternative
dispute resolution processes such as co-resolution and collaborative law.
However, by applying the principles of dependent advocacy, this article
concludes by proposing a method for attorneys to replicate the collegiality
observed in small-town legal practice by offering services as part of organized
legal practice groups with limited numbers of opposing counsel.
In challenging the requirement that advocates in every context operate
independently, this article will explore the specific conditions that require
independence and the effects of relationships on interactions between
opposing advocates. Digging at the foundations of independent counsel will
unearth unique insights into the relationship between attorney loyalty and the
heterogeneous nature of the society that is enforcing its collective will with
binding laws, how the ethical requirements of professionals other than
attorneys are affected by their relationship to binding law, the ideal game
theory relationship between opposing advocates in the context of litigation as
compared to negotiation, and also the decline in professionalism among
attorneys and how this trend could be reversed.
The overall goal of this analysis is to offer another form of advocacy alongside
independent attorneys. In one ideal application of these ideas, disputants will be
able to frame their disagreements within the bounds of the law by using
independent counsel to evaluate their situations but would then be able to
negotiate their particular interests using advocates that are better suited for
cooperation. In the other application of dependent advocacy, legal advocates alter
their relationship to incentivize an amicable approach to litigation. Both
applications create new options for disputants and additional services for dispute
resolution professionals to expand and better apply their services.
II. THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENCE BETWEEN ATTORNEYS
All of the integral aspects of legal advocacy require that advocates operate
independently. In their function as advisors over binding rules and procedures
that carry the force of the collective society, legal advocates must support the
client, independent of any conflicting loyalties.1 Because the utility of binding
law as a method of resolving disputes lies in unilateral action against an
unwilling party, professionals applying these laws must act separately.' And
'See infra Section I.A.
2 See infra Section I.B.
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the adversarial procedures applied in this system require a zealousness that is
facilitated by complete independence between legal advocates. ' Thus,
independence is built into the role of legal advocates because of their function
in the process of litigating binding law.
However, attorneys do not always operate as litigators. While knowledge
of legal rights is important to navigating clients through their dispute,
attorneys often resolve cases through informal negotiation rather than
adjudication in front of a powerful third-party.4 In fact, the emergence of
collaborative law clearly demonstrates that advocacy is useful without even a
possibility of entering the courtroom. If independence between advocates is
specifically designed to address the application of binding law in an
adversarial adjudicatory process, is such independence necessary when
advocacy is limited to voluntary, informal negotiation among the parties?
Before this question is addressed, the direct link between litigation and
independence will be explored to detail in order to explain when and why
independence is necessary between advocates.
A. Binding Law Requires Loyalty Through Independence
First, attorneys are distinct from other professionals in that their expertise
is in a system of rules that society has collectively determined to be
inescapable and binding. In order to counsel clients regarding the forcible
deprivation of their property and freedom, legal advocates must act with
unhindered loyalty. As will be demonstrated below, ethical rules that regulate
professionals in the context of these binding deprivations ensure loyalty by
requiring the professionals to act independently. This section will therefore
show that independence between professionals is a product of working within
a system of binding rules and, conversely, that working outside of a system of
binding rules should not require independence.
Beginning the analysis broadly, the legal system is a network of
procedures and sanctions enforcing the norms that society as a whole has
designated to be binding.5 Acting by proxy, the government channels the
'See infra Section I.C.
'See generally Abraham L. Wickelgren, Law of Economics and Settlement, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS (ed. Jennifer Arlen, 2015) (describing settlement
rates in tort cases); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and
Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 115 (2009).
'Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U.L. REv. 781, 787
(1989) (citing John Rawls' seminal definition of a legal system, stating that a "legal system
is a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational persons for the purpose of
regulating their conduct and providing the framework for social cooperation"); ANTHONY
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collective will of society to create broadly applicable laws and resolve
individual disputes.6 Because the legal system exercises the power of the
entire society against individuals,7 the judiciary is a fallible, human institution
8
that wields an incredible amount of coercive power.9
D'AMATO, HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE LAW (1989), at 1 (defining the function of law as
"artificial mechanism designed to channel human behavior into directions society wants");
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235 (1971) (describing the legal system as a system
of rules intended to promote cooperation while regulating conduct); Gregory C. Keating,
Fidelity to Pre-Existing Law and the Legitimacy of Legal Decision, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 4 (1993) (asserting that law defines rights and duties and governs expectations);
Benedict Kingsbury, Foreword: Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals
a Systemic Problem?, 31 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 679, 688 (1999); (quoting the definition
of a legal order as "a system of norms binding on determined subjects which trigger some
pre-established consequences when the subjects breach their obligations."); Laura Nader,
A Comparative Perspective on Legal Evolution, Revolution, and Devolution, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 993, 998 (1983) ("Traditionally, law has been conceived as the property of a society
as a whole. As a logical consequence, a given society was thought to have only one legal
system that controlled the behavior of all its members.")
6 Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, What Is A Lawyer? A Reconstruction of the Lawyer
as an Officer of the Court, 31 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 425, 447 (2012) ("The legislative
machine weaves the social fabric on a grand scale, through the collaboration of lawmakers
who represent the collective public (and who are lobbied by representatives from specific
groups)"); James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing Popular
Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 189, 202-03 (1990)
("[S]ociety's members, also known as 'the people,' generally find it advantageous to create
a government to handle the chores associated with collective self-rule.... The government,
Locke argues, is thus no more than an agent of the people.").
' Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 1, 87 (2002) ("[P]ublic law speaks authoritatively for the entire society, binding all
who are subject to it."); Leon R. Yankwich, The Art of Being a Judge, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
374, 375 (1957) ("Pound's definition of law is: 'social control through the orderly and
systematic application of the force of politically organized society'... What gives strength
to law is the fact that through it is expressed the desire of the community to regulate and
control certain activities and relations .... As society developed, it became necessary to
formulate some of these customs, rules and regulations into a code of laws having behind
it the sanction and force of the whole community.") (emphasis added).
8 Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts,
94 GEo. L.J. 1, 25 (2005) (noting that "the proper use of retribution is far from guaranteed
in a legal system run by fallible human beings."); Charles I. Lugosi, The Rejection of
Divine Law in American Jurisprudence: The Ten Commandments, Trivia, and the Stars
and Stripes, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 641, 669 (2006) (discussing the tension "between
God's infallible divine laws that give shape to natural law that is imbued with justice, and
fallible human made law, that artificially erects a parallel legal system that is often prone
to injustice.").
9 Matthew D. Friedlander, Adjudicating in the Kingdom of Ends: A Constructivist
Response to the Hart/Dworkin Debate, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1387, 1388 (2011) ("In a legal
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The courts that compose the judiciary then admit certain professionals-
based on expert knowledge of the binding rules and procedures°--to be
privately retained by individuals to assist in the management of their cases."
By advising their clients about rights and obligations, such experts exercise
the authority of the state as it forces behavior that would not otherwise occur.
12
Though it may be argued, philosophically, that law is made binding not by the
powerful state but rather by underlying morality13 or by the tendency of people
to comply with these written rules, 14 these considerations would be
unimportant to the people who hire professionals to address the forcible
deprivation of their property or freedom. The considerable power handled by
these experts on binding authority should therefore distinguish them from
other experts.
system that places an enormous amount of power in the judiciary, questions concerning
the proper role of the judge are paramount.").
10 Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90
HARv. L. REv. 702, 708 (1977) ("[T]he Code supports the necessity for lawyers by pointing
to the 'complex nature of our legal system' and emphasizing the desirability of a 'personal
relationship' with someone having 'a disciplined, analytic approach to legal problems, and
a firm ethical commitment."').
" Hussey Freeland, supra note 6, at 445 ("The state channels formidable power to the
court to fulfill its charge of applying the law and ruling justly. The court, in turn, appoints
lawyers to represent parties (inter alia): to manifest properly private persons whose
interests are to appear for judgment.").
2 Michael Torrance, Persuasive Authority Beyond the State: A Theoretical Analysis
of Transnational Corporate Social Responsibility Norms as Legal Reasons Within Positive
Legal Systems, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1573, 1586 (2011) ("The 'authoritative' expertise of these
norm generators becomes embedded in the rules and norms themselves, which in turn
become institutionalized through the constraints they impose on their norm-subjects,
including even public policy makers. Such epistemological authorities.. .exercise more
than simply expert judgment in the provision of advice, and may also act as an evaluator
of conduct.... In this way, these experts are able to constrain behaviors and exert significant
pressure on actors within their systems.").
"3 Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630, 632 (1958) (promoting a natural law philosophy in which morality is the
source of law's binding power and arguing that "[l]aw, as something deserving loyalty,
must represent a human achievement; it cannot be a simple fiat of power or a repetitive
pattern discernible in the behavior of state officials.").
14 Torrance, supra note 12, at 1547. ("[Tlhe most salient question in determining legal
relevance is whether norms are actually obeyed in practice."); Radin, supra note 5 at 782-
83 (pointing to the "conception of rules, commonly attributed to Wittgenstein, which holds
that rules can only be claimed to exist when there is community agreement in practice. To
put this conception roughly, agreement in action does not follow from there being a pre-
existing rule; agreement in action is the only basis for claiming that there is a rule."); Id. at
797 (questioning "how we should understand the notion that rules are 'binding.' In what
consists the 'binding-ness' of rules? The skeptic says, 'This bond cannot be shown."').
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While doctors are entrusted with their patients' lives and psychologists are
entrusted with their clients' deepest secrets, legal professionals are unique in
that they assist one individual who is faced with the collective power of society
embodied in the state. The clash between individual rights and such social
regulation forges a unique relationship between legal professional and client.15
Serving one person against the collective whole demands a key virtue from
legal professionals: loyalty. 6 For a variety of reasons described below,
working in a system of rules that bind and potentially coerce the client
demands an elevated duty of loyalty from the professional.
Ranging from the philosophical to the practical, the reasons for legal
professionals to offer an elevated duty of loyalty to their clients are rooted in
the binding nature of law. The philosophical reasons for such loyalty relate to
fairness of the judicial system and the value of individual autonomy. In order
to enforce societal norms on all individuals in a heterogeneous society, the
judiciary must appear to be fair to all 7 and achieves this image with attorneys
who operate independently of this system' 8 and with overriding loyalty to their
"5 Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1077 (1976) ("The [lawyer-client] relation must exist in order
to realize the client's rights against society, to preserve that measure of autonomy which
social regulation must allow the individual.").
16 Mary C. Daly, To Betray Once? To Betray Twice?: Reflections on Confidentiality,
A Guilty Client, an Innocent Condemned Man, and an Ethics-Seeking Defense Counsel, 29
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1611, 1624 (1996) ("Thus, in the end, the lawyer's virtue-loyalty-is
linked to the client's rights-autonomy and privacy.").
"7 Gerald P. Moran, A Radical Theory of Jurisprudence: The "Decisionmaker" As the
Source of Law-the Ohio Supreme Court's Adoption of the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine As
A Model, 30 AKRON L. REV. 393, 461 (1997) ("The judiciary, as an institution, is a natural
outgrowth of the resulting difficulty of enforcing emerging national norms on both a
heterogeneous and homogenous society. Thus, we have developed the judiciary as a
necessary bureaucratic mechanism to exercise independent autonomy over the entire
community. In light of this judicial process and the courts' direct 'exercise' of power,
society must, in turn, believe that our legal system is fair and, like some fairy tale, equally
applied to all. Indeed, society must believe, either consciously or subconsciously, that such
a perfect mosaic of divine principles exists in order to ensure each individual's
interdependent commitment to and acceptance of the community's norms.").
18 Marc Feldman & Jay M. Feinman, Legal Education: Its Cause and Cure, 82 MICH.
L. REV. 914, 924 (1984) ("How is it possible that lawyers could play this central role for
such a socially diverse, politically contentious people? Only because they have claimed to
be above the fray throughout history."); Eleanor W. Myers, Examining Independence and
Loyalty, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 857, 862 (1999) ("This aspect of independence is the freedom
to pursue client interests free from coercive controls by the state. It is a prerequisite to
serving the client with loyalty. If our legal system did not permit lawyers' independence
from state imperatives, lawyers would not be free to advocate loyally on behalf of
clients.").
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clients.19 As a result, the call for attorneys to focus their loyalties on clients
and thereby oppose the powerful state is found in foundational legal theories,
20
U.S. Supreme Court rulings, 21 and in arguments on the morality of American
legal ethics.22 This link between the diversity of society and the philosophy
of the justice system, which enforces a single set of binding rules on its
members, is reflected in the focus on client loyalty of American attorneys as
contrasted with the overriding loyalty to the justice system exercised by
19 Timothy J. Miller, The Attorney's Duty to Reveal a Client's Intended Future
Criminal Conduct, 1984 DUKE L.J. 582, 594 (1984) ("A client who believes that his
attorney's loyalties are divided between the client and society in general, may feel that
society has an unfair edge."); Jason J. Kilbom, Who's in Charge Here?: Putting Clients in
Their Place, 37 GA. L. REV. 1, 24 (2002) ("The primary objectives of law had migrated
away from maintaining the purity and inviolability of the legal system; they now moved
toward engaging the system to advance individual rights. In a society coming to grips with
diversity of race, gender, culture, and economic condition, lawyers could no longer
maintain their homogenous notion of 'the client' and her 'interests."'); Michael K.
McChrystal, Lawyers and Loyalty, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 367, 377 (1992) ("Monroe
Freedman's recent work suggests a Roycian loyalty to causes, upon which Freedman
carefully constructs a theory of legal ethics. Freedman's causes are the adversary system
and client dignity and autonomy under the law. Out of loyalty to these causes, Freedman
develops a powerful duty of loyalty to the client.").
20 In legal theory, from formal legal reasoning to late nineteenth-century classicism to
atomistic legal reasoning to Lasswell-McDougal policy science, law and lawyers are seen
as independent of society but useful to it. Throughout, the emphasis is on the process of
lawmaking rather than its substantive effects on and its difference from other systems of
social, political and ethical judgment. ROBERT BOCKING STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s 131-133, 264-66 (1983).
21 Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318- 19 (1981) ("In our system a defense
lawyer characteristically opposes the designated representatives of the State. The system
assumes that adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and
fairness. But it posits that a defense lawyer best serves the public, not by acting on behalf
of the State or in concert with it, but rather by advancing 'the undivided interests of his
client."').
22 "Individuals have rights over and against the collectivity. The moral capital arising
out of individuals' concrete situations is one way of expressing that structure of rights, or
at least part of it. It is because the law must respect the rights of individuals that the law
must also create and support the specific role of legal friend.... When I say the lawyer is
his client's legal friend, I mean the lawyer makes his client's interests his own insofar as
this is necessary to preserve and foster the client's autonomy within the law. This argument
does not require us to assume that the law is hostile to the client's rights. All we need to
assume is that even a system of law which is perfectly sensitive to personal rights would
not work fairly unless the client could claim a professional's assistance in realizing that
autonomy which the law recognizes." Fried, supra note 15, at 1073.
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attorneys in more homogenous societies. 3 Thus, when society presses binding
law against individual autonomy, considerations of fairness dictate that
experts in such laws exercise loyalty that is proportionate to the diversity found
in that society.
Furthermore, a system of binding laws poses a variety of practical reasons
for its experts to promise undivided loyalty to clients. First, people with legal
problems may act less on their understanding of the complicated structure of
laws and procedures and more on a sense of fairness that is enhanced through
the guidance of a loyal advocate. 4 Next, experts in law represent individuals
against adverse interests in society and must thereby address morally
ambiguous situations.2 The simple ethic of loyalty to clients thereby allows
legal experts to navigate these subjective dilemmas, provide uniform
23 Martin A. Rogoff, A Comparison of Constitutionalism in France and the United
States, 49 ME. L. REv. 21,45-46 (1997) ("Lawyers trained in the American system tend to
view law as a tool to accomplish desired ends, rather than as a static body of principles and
rules. Lawyers, as law students, have been taught to work with the legal materials at their
disposal in innovative ways to create new legal doctrines and theories to advance the causes
of their clients."). See also Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Perestroika or Just Perfunctory? The
Scope and Significance of Russia's New Legal Ethics Laws, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 25, 53
(2010) (contrasting the attorney's role in civil law (Russian, European) and common law
(American) jurisdictions: "[H]is ultimate duty is to the court and society in the civil law
system and thus he should help minimize the burden placed on the court system, while the
attorney is completely independent in a common law system and is not considered a part
of the court system."); Janeen Kerper & Gary L. Stuart, Rambo Bites the Dust: Current
Trends in Deposition Ethics, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 103, 107 (1998) ("While American
lawyers often feel tom by the tension between the duty of zealous advocacy and the duty
to the larger system of justice, this conflict is less troublesome to British barristers like
Lord Brougham who swear an oath to seek only the truth and whose traditions strongly
emphasize the preeminence of the advocate's obligations to justice and the court.... The
concept of court first, client second has long been more generally accepted by British
lawyers than it is by Americans.").
24 Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value Among
Many or A Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 349, 351-52 (1981) ("People
with legal problems need help; they often do not understand the complicated legal system
in which they are enmeshed. Their sense of fairness (as well as ours) is enhanced when
they need not fend for themselves -when they are entitled to the services of other people
who understand the system and whose function within the system is to be on their side.
This simple and powerful ideal of legal representation is obviously sacrificed when a client
senses that his attorney's loyalties are divided.").
25 Richard K. Greenstein, Against Professionalism, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 327, 341
(2009) ("Unlike many other professionals, lawyers act in an agency capacity. Doctors treat
patients, but lawyers represent clients. That means that lawyers will routinely interact with
individuals and institutions whose interests are different from and often adverse to those
of the client. And that means that serving the client's interests will frequently appear to
encourage acts by the lawyer that will harm those third parties.").
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representation as part of a fair and balanced system, and rely on the adversarial
court system to sort out truth and justice.26 Finally, the promise of loyalty
promotes the use and quality of legal services.27 While the same could be said
for any service or business, the promise of loyalty is especially important in
the context of binding legal systems because clients may be mistrustful of legal
experts who work within a system that may exert coercive force over the client.
At least one study has shown that a majority of laypersons believe that
professionals who do not address binding laws (such as priests, doctors, and
psychologists) have greater obligations to keep secrets and are more
26 McChrystal, supra note 19, at 387 ("Lawyers can envision a proper balance of the
conflicting loyalties to which they will be subject in their work. Ethics rules exemplify a
formal effort to do just that"); Id. at 388 ("these difficult questions lead to this conclusion:
even the most clear-cut moral priorities can lose their force in unanticipated and
extraordinary circumstances"); Greenstein, supra note 25, at 329 ("Ethical simplification
for legal professionals rests on two pillars, which I will call the rule of partiality (the
requirement that ethical priority be accorded the client) and the 'no remainder' principle
(the tenet that following the rule of partiality exhausts the professional's ethical
responsibility)."); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on
Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 706 (1981) ("In any system of justice,
particularly one whose central premise is combative, participants must share a common
understanding of the ground rules that constrain their partisanship.").
27 George H. Brown, Financial Institution Lawyers As Quasi-Public Enforcers, 7
GEO. J. LEGAL ETMCs 637, 712 (1994) ("It is easy to understand why unsophisticated
individuals need to be encouraged to confide all to their lawyer, and the promise of
unyielding loyalty promotes a more effective system of criminal justice."); Fred C.
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 358 (1989) ("clients will not
employ lawyers, or at least will not provide them with adequate information, unless all
aspects of the attorney-client relationship remain secret"); McChrystal, supra at note 19,
at 401 ("'Exit,' as developed in economic theory, refers to the actions of customers who
stop buying a firm's product and of members of an organization who leave the
organization.... 'Voice,' a term borrowed from political theory, is exercised when a firm's
customers or an organization's members express dissatisfaction to management or
others.... Loyalty is a self-imposed barrier to exit, and, like most barriers to exit, it serves
to stimulate voice."); Mary C. Daly, To Betray Once? To Betray Twice?: Reflections on
Confidentiality, a Guilty Client, an Innocent Condemned Man, and an Ethics Seeking
Defense Counsel, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1611, 1624 (1996) (stating that "confidentiality
improves the quality of legal advice that lawyers give clients. Improved legal advice leads
to more just verdicts and settlements and to more fair transactions, thus benefitting society
as a whole."); Kristin Henning, It Takes a Lawyer to Raise a Child?: Allocating
Responsibilities Among Parents, Children, and Lawyers in Delinquency Cases, 6 NEV. L.J.
836, 845 (2006) ("A child who is unpersuaded by the attorney's loyalty may withhold
critical information from the attorney and compromise the lawyer's ability to provide
relevant and useful advice.").
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trustworthy with information than are legal professionals. 2 There are,
therefore, a wide variety of reasons for professionals in the field of binding
law to guarantee loyalty to their clients.
However, to truly determine whether experts on binding law owe
heightened loyalty to their clients, the duties placed on such experts must be
compared the duties of experts in other fields. The hypothesis explored below
is that legal professionals must carry duties of loyalty to clients that do not
exist in other professions.
Because experts who provide important services directly to the public
carry considerable power over their clients29-who may not understand this
esoteric body of knowledge well enough to regulate such autonomous
professionals themselves 3 -the public prestige that marks the professions31
2 Zacharias, supra note 27, at 384. (citing a Yale study that found that clients were
more likely to believe that professional who do not work within broader systems that
exercise direct authority over the client (priests, doctors, psychologists, and psychiatrists)
were more likely to maintain confidences than professionals who work within such systems
(attorneys, accountants, social workers. The author notes that "[flew were prepared to trust
lawyers over priests, doctors, psychologists, or psychiatrists.").
29 Luisa Antoniolli, Consumer Law as an Instance of the Law of Diversity, 30 VT. L.
REV. 855, 878 (2006) ("[I]t is usually considered necessary to provide consumers with all
relevant information, rather than prescribing the content of contract. Once consumers have
this information, they will be able to look after their own interests. Nevertheless, ... there
is an inherent difference in the position-and consequently the power-of a consumer and
a professional...."); Hugh P. Gunz & Sally P. Gunz, Client Capture and the Professional
Service Firm, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 685, 692 (2008) ("The collegiate professions were
traditionally law, medicine, and the priesthood. They were evidenced by a degree of
mystification of knowledge that increased the power and social distance between
professional and client.").
30 Greenstein, supra note 25, at 331-32; Criton A. Constantinides, ProfessionalEthics
Codes in Court: Redefining the Social Contract Between the Public and the Professions,
25 GA. L. REV. 1327, 1332 (1991) ("One of the most basic characteristics of a profession
is the existence of a body of esoteric knowledge on which the practitioner relies.
Professionals derive much of their power through their exclusive access to that knowledge
which is gained through formal education and training.").
" Hon. Alva Hugh Maddox, Lawyers: The Aristocracy of Democracy or "Skunks, Snakes,
and Sharks?", 29 CUMB. L. REV. 323,326 (1999) ("Although there is no specific agreement on
what distinguishes a profession from a trade or business, it is generally accepted that a
profession involves the pursuit of a learned art that requires superior intellectual ability, and that
the services that are rendered by professionals are vital to society."); Greenstein, supra note 25,
at 331-32; Constantinides, supra note 29, at 1332 ("One of the most basic characteristics of a
profession is the existence of a body of esoteric knowledge on which the practitioner relies.
Professionals derive much of their power through their exclusive access to that knowledge
which is gained through formal education and training.").
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also arouses public concern.32 Though the consumer retains the market power
to choose the most loyal expert,33 the desire to foster public trust3 4and regulate
their colleagues35 have led professionals to form official organizations and
disseminate ethics rules codifying the various loyalties owed by
practitioners. 36 So, while the creation of ethics codes is not entirely
understood 37 and certainly not uniform, it appears to be clear that the
professions draft these rules in order to benefit their specific profession as a
32 "The importance of services provided by professionals-the widespread sense that
they are crucial to the 'day-to-day functioning of society'-tends to generate a concern
about ethical behavior. This concern has both a public dimension (criticism of
professionals for departing from proper ethical conduct) and a dimension within the
profession (a gatekeeping desire to limit membership in the profession to those who adhere
to identifiable ethical standards)." Greenstein, supra note 25, at 332.
"3 Norman W. Spaulding, The Prophet and the Bureaucrat: Positional Conflicts in
Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1395, 1408 (1998) ("Clients have a powerful
mechanism for enforcing their concept of positional loyalty quite independent of the bar's
ethical mandates. A paying client's market power gives her the freedom to shop around for
the firm that meets her expectations of loyalty.").
3' Rhode, supra note 26, at 692-93. ("A principal function of all professional
organizations is to protect their members' economic and psychological stake in public
esteem. Codes of ethics are useful insofar as they define a satisfactory self-image and help
persuade the general public that practitioners are especially deserving of confidence,
respect, and substantial remuneration.").
" Warren E. Burger, Ethics andthe Law, 42 S.C. L. REV. 782, Preface (1991) ("A true
profession is one that polices itself.")
36 McChrystal, supra note 19, at 384 ("Loyalty, then, can be an organizing principle
for moral decisionmaking in the sense that many moral issues often require a choice
between loyalties."); id at 387 ("[L]awyers can envision a proper balance of the conflicting
loyalties to which they will be subject in their work. Ethics rules exemplify a formal effort
to do just that."); Greenstein, supra note 25, at 332 ("[E]xternal and internal pressures
frequently resolve themselves in the promulgation of 'official' ethics codes by the
organized professionals.").
37 Mark H. Aultman, The Story of a Rule, 2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 713,
716-17 (2000) ("Why codes of legal ethics had to come is still debated, and not all the
reasons are accepted or understood.").
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whole,38 even though such rules restrain individual practitioners.39 Because
authorities in each field create and modify professional ethics codes to strike
a balance between autonomy and baseline requirements for their practitioners,
ethics rules should therefore mark the appropriate degree of loyalty owed by
each profession to their respective clients.
While the obligation of competent4" and diligent41 services tends to be
mandated by simple directive, the duty of loyalty is addressed in these ethics
codes under rules regarding conflicts of interest.42 This is likely because issues
38 Rhode, supra note 26, at 689-90. ("From the profession's standpoint, codes of ethics
are a primary instrument for attaining what Talcott Parsons posited as the dominant goals
for any occupation: objective achievement and recognition. Codified standards can
generate monetary and psychic benefits by enhancing occupational status and self-image;
constraining competition; preserving autonomy; and reconciling client, colleague, and
institutional interests. From a societal perspective, however, professional codes are
desirable only insofar as they serve common goals to a greater extent than other forms of
control, namely market forces or government regulation."); Susan P. Shapiro,
Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in the Practice of Law and Real
Life, 28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 87 (2003) ("A long-standing scholarly tradition regards
professions, in general, and ethics rules, in particular, as 'projects' of market control.").
"9 Sean J. Griffith, Ethical Rules and Collective Action: An Economic Analysis of
Legal Ethics, 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 347, 349 (2002) "Because the rules of legal ethics are
drafted by the organized bar, an association of self-interested lawyers, the rules of legal
ethics should thus be seen as a means of maximizing the welfare of lawyers. On the one
hand, it may seem counter-intuitive to assert that the rules of legal ethics advance lawyers'
self-interest when, in fact, the rules generally seem to restrain the self-interest of lawyers.")
40 Model Rules of Prof'I Conduct, R. 1.1 (2009); Ethical Principles of Psychologists
and Code of Conduct, Standard 2 (2010); American Medical Association's Code of
Medical Ethics, Opinion 8.11, Opinion 9.01 (1982); Code of Ethics of the National
Association of Social Workers, 1.04 (1996); American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants Code of Professional Conduct, 0.300.060 (2014).
41 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASs'N 2009); CODE OF MED.
ETHICS Op. 8.11 (AM. MEDICAL ETHICS 1996); CODE OF MED. ETHICS Op. 9.14 (AM.
MEDICAL ETHICS 2009); CODE OF ETHICS 1.01 (NAT'L ASS'N OF SOC. WORKERS 1996);
CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 0.300.060 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PuB. ACCTS. 2014).
42 Audrey I. Benison, The Sophisticated Client: A Proposal for the Reconciliation of
Conflicts of Interest Standards for Attorneys and Accountants, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
699, 712 (2000) (noting that three issues, including "the overarching concern of loyalty to
the client, underlie the rules regulating conflicts of interest"); Donald R. Lundberg, We
Really Are All in This Together: Imputation of Conflicts of Interest, RES GESTAE, October
2012, at 15 ("Imputation is a powerful limitation... client loyalty is the driving
consideration here."); Rebecca A. Lewis, As A Matter of Fact...Practice Tips from Bar
Counsel, Wyo. LAW, 36, 32 (2008) (noting that Rule 1.7, concerning conflicts of interest
with current clients "is really about loyalty to your client."); J. Anthony McLain, Part-
Time Judges, Part-Time Assistant District Attorneys and Imputed Disqualification, 70
ALA. LAW. 217, 219 (2009) (discussing "the true purpose of rules 1.7(a) and 1.10(a), which
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of loyalty involve a balancing of interests to the client, to the profession, and
to society.43 As a result, if legal professionals carry a higher burden of loyalty
to their clients44 by nature of assisting them in their fight against the binding
legal procedures imposed by the rest of society, then the conflict of interest
rules should be more onerous for legal professionals than for other
professionals.45
Conflict of interest rules do vary among the professions, ranging along a
continuum from prohibitions of conflicts between the client and professional
to prohibitions of conflicts between clients of the same professional to
prohibitions of conflicts between clients of different professionals who work
in the same firm.
The most basic rules regarding conflicts of interest prohibit the
professional from assisting any client whose personal interests are contrary to
the professional's "personal interests" (personal conflicts of interest).46 To
is the preservation of client loyalty and confidences"); Captain Donald L. Burnett, Jr.,
USAR, The Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct: Critical Concerns for Military
Lawyers, ARMY LAWYER, February 1987, at 19,23 ("Rules prohibiting conflicts of interest
arise from two fundamental principles in lawyer-client relationships: confidentiality and
loyalty."); Lee E. Hejmanowski, An Ethical Treatment of Attorneys'Personal Conflicts of
Interest, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 881, 899 (1993) ("The reasons to prohibit attorney-client
conflicts thus include (1) the fear that the attorney's pursuit of personal goals will violate
the duty of loyalty attorneys owe their clients..."); Shira Mizrahi, Up Against the Wall: A
Guide to the Effective Screening of Former Government Attorneys in New York, 10
CARDOZO PuB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 131, 145 (2011) ("Courts have reasoned, '[a] lay client
is likely to doubt the loyalty of a lawyer who undertakes to oppose him in an unrelated
matter.' As such, rules regulating attorneys' professional conduct have prohibited them
from working on matters which would be considered adverse to a client's interest.").
4' Nancy J. Moore, "In the Interests of Justice": Balancing Client Loyalty and the
Public Good in the Twenty-First Century, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1775 (2002); McChrystal,
supra note 19, at 384 ("Loyalty, then, can be an organizing principle for moral
decisionmaking in the sense that many moral issues often require a choice between
loyalties."); id at 387 ("[L]awyers can envision a proper balance of the conflicting loyalties
to which they will be subject in their work. Ethics rules exemplify a formal effort to do just
that.").
4Mizrahi, supra note 42, at 144-45. ("One of the cornerstones underlying all attorney
ethics rules is that attorneys have a duty to remain loyal to their clients. This duty is
threatened when attorney conflicts of interest arise.").
41 Michelle Querijero, Without Lawyers: An Ethical View of the Torture Memos, 23
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHCS 241, 247 (2010) ("It is the binding nature of the legal advice
provided by the OLC that magnifies the importance of the ethical obligations of such
lawyers.").
46 Lee E. Hejmanowski, An Ethical Treatment of Attorneys' Personal Conflicts of
Interest, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 881, 882 (1993) ("'[P]ersonal' conflicts of interest, differ from
typical conflicts, which involve the adverse interests of competing clients.").
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avoid incentives for the professional to take advantage of their clients' trust or
confidences,47 these personal conflicts of interest are prohibited by all codes
of professional ethics. 48  Next, when professionals assist their clients in
matters of competing interests, prejudice is presumed if the professional also
assists people with adverse interests, 49 and conflict of interest rules thereby
take a further step by prohibiting conflicting representations.5 ° The rationale
behind these rules is that the professional should not be allowed to use their
position of trust with one client against another and should not offer
substandard services to the disfavored of two opposing clients. " The
imputation of conflicts expands the preventative rule against assisting
antagonistic clients52 by preventing professionals working in the same firm
" Sharon Mary Mathew, Stock-Based Compensation for Legal Services: Resurrecting
the Ethical Dilemma, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1227, 1231 (2002) ("An attorney owes
many duties to his clients.... All of these ethical concerns are threatened when an attorney's
personal interests conflict with the interests of his client.... This rationale is clearly
'preventive' in nature.").
48 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7-1.10 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2009); ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT Standard 3.06 (AM. PSYCHOL.
Ass'N 2010); CODE OF MED. ETHICS Op. 8.03 (AM. MEDICAL ETHICS 1996); CODE OF
ETHICS 1.06 (NAT'L Ass'N OF SOC. WORKERS 1996); CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT
1.110.010, 1.110.010 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2014); CODE OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Standard 3.4 (AM. ASS'N FOR MARRIAGE AND FAMILY THERAPY (2015).
4' Richard W. Mass, Forfeiture of Attorneys'Fees: Should Defendants Be Allowed to
Retain the 'Rolls Royce of Attorneys' with the 'Fruits of the Crime'?, 39 STAN. L. REV.
663, 677 (1987) ("[P]rejudice is presumed if the defendant proves that his lawyer 'actively
represented conflicting interests'... the rationale underlying this presumption should
similarly apply to all conflicts of interest an attorney faces. A lawyer owes his client a duty
of loyalty; a duty to avoid conflicts of interest.").
50 NAT'L Ass'N OF SOC. WORKERS, supra note 48 ("Social workers should not engage
in dual or multiple relationships with clients or former clients in which there is a risk of
exploitation or potential harm to the client.") However, note that this rule does not lead to
removal or disqualification and goes on to allow for these conflicts with protective action.
See id. ("Social workers who anticipate a conflict of interest among the individuals
receiving services or who anticipate having to perform in potentially conflicting roles ...
should clarify their role with the parties involved and take appropriate action to minimize
any conflict of interest.").
" RESTATEMENT (THIRD), LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 122 cmt. b ("The prohibition
against lawyer conflicts of interest is intended to assure clients that a lawyer's work will be
characterized by loyalty, vigor, and confidentiality.").
52 Donald R. Lundberg, We Really Are All in This Together: Imputation of Conflicts
of Interest, RES GESTAE, October 2012, at 19 ("Imputation of conflicts of interest is a
powerful mechanism that expands on the personal loyalties and duties to clients that all
lawyers naturally feel to institutionalize those loyalties...").
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from assisting clients with adverse interests.53 Because it makes broad
assumptions about professionals obtaining and sharing information,54 and is
more a cosmetic rule that avoids the appearance of impropriety that occurs
when professional adversaries share an overarching relationship,55 professions
that impute conflicts of interest hold the highest concern for their practitioners'
duty of loyalty to the individual client. By preventing two professionals with
aligned interests from assisting clients with adverse interests, this ethical
scheme elevates loyalty through insulated independence between the
professionals. Thus, the behaviors decreed in ethical conflicts of interest rules
range from promoting diligence to promoting loyalty to promoting
independence.
The hypothesis that experts on society's binding laws owe the highest duty
of loyalty to their clients appears to be confirmed by comparative analysis of
conflict of interest rules between legal professionals and professionals who do
not oppose the collective will of society on behalf of their clients.
First, professionals who are responsible for their clients' individual well-
being are only precluded from taking on clients with personal conflicts of
interest. Physicians do not face ethical quandaries by attending to combatants
who have caused physical wounds to each other,56 and psychologists are not
ethically prevented from counseling people who are causing each other mental
53 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7-1.10 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2009); Lundberg,
supra note 42, at 15 ("The basic idea of imputed conflicts is straightforward, no lawyer in
a firm may represent a client if any lawyer in the firm would be personally conflicted from
handling the client's matter."); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Imputed Conflicts of Interest in
International Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 489, 492 (2005) ("The basic
approach in the American rules has been that if one lawyer in a firm is personally precluded
from a prospective multiple representation, then all lawyers in the firm are similarly
precluded.").
14 Hejmanowski, supra note 46, at 909-10 ("Courts actually make two presumptions
when they apply vicarious disqualification in successive representation conflicts. The first
presumption is that the attorney obtained knowledge of a client's confidences while at the
former firm. The second presumption is that the attorney has shared those confidences with
members of the new firm.").
" The appearance of impropriety was the early rationale for imputing conflicts in
American courts. Though this standard fell out of use because it was too subjective, the
overarching concern remain the driving rationale for the rule. See id. at 903-04 (1993)
("One problem with the appearance-of-impropriety standard is the issue of who ought to
judge the appearance of impropriety.... In perhaps the most commonly cited explanation
of the shift away from Canon 9, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that
'when there is no claim that the trial will be tainted, appearance of impropriety is simply
too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order except in the rarest cases."').
56 CODE OF MED. ETHICS Op. 8.03 (AM. MEDICAL ETHICS 1996).
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distress,57 though they must keep the confidences of individual clients.58 This
ethical treatment makes sense; professionals who focus on individual, internal
problems do not promote certain interests in direct opposition to other
interests, and such professionals should be ethically unhindered from helping
as many people as possible, regardless of their relationships to others.
Therefore, these professionals do not owe a duty of loyalty to clients when
assisting them in strictly individual problems.
On the other hand, professionals who address interpersonal issues59 have
ethical duties beyond personal conflicts that restrain them from assisting
clients who have antagonistic interests. 60 This shift from regulating
professional-client conflicts only to also prohibit client-client conflicts is
illustrated in the contrast between social workers and other mental health
professionals. Though they share educational backgrounds in human behavior
and can perform functions similar to other therapists, social workers assist
their clients in dealing with larger entities such as government agencies and
community groups.6' As a result, unlike other mental health professionals,
social workers are ethically cautioned from providing services to clients with
conflicting interests.62 Ethical rules precluding conflicts of interest between
" ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT Standard 3.06
(AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N 2010). Though psychologists are cautioned to avoid "multiple
relationships" in Standard 3.05, this rule appears to be directed at a personal relationship
conflicting with a professional relationship, rather than a professional relationship
conflicting with another professional relationship. Standard 3.05 more closely resembles
the American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy, Code of Professional Ethics
Standard 1.3 than rules that prohibit assistance to clients with adverse interests.
58 Samuel J. Knapp, Privileged Communications for Psychotherapists in
Pennsylvania: A Time for Statutory Reform, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 267, 268 (1987) ("The rules of
confidentiality originated in the ethical codes of the mental health professions.").
" Michael T. Colatrella Jr., A "Lawyer for All Seasons": The Lawyer as Conflict
Manager, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 100 (2012) ("Few professionals deal with conflict
more consistently and directly than lawyers. Business, health care, and sales professionals
all encounter a good number of conflicts in their day-to-day professional lives, but these
conflicts are ancillary to their professions.... Unlike these professionals, the main business
of most lawyers is conflict."); CODE OF ETHICS Preamble (NAT'L ASS'N OF SOC. WORKERS
1996) (The "defining feature of social work is the profession's focus on individual well-
being in a social context and the well-being of society.").
60 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7-1.9 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2009); CODE OF
ETHICS 1.06 (NAT'L ASS'N OF SOC. WORKERS 1996).
61 CODE OF ETHICS 1.06 (NAT'L ASS'N OF SOC. WORKERS 1996) ("Social workers are
cognizant of their dual responsibility to clients and to the broader society. They seek to
resolve conflicts between clients' interests and the broader society's interests in a socially
responsible manner consistent with the values, ethical principles, and ethical standards of
the profession.").
62 Id.
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clients of the same professional are therefore tied to the degree that the
professional's assistance opposes others on behalf of the client.
By addressing laws that the collective society has determined to be binding
on individuals and thereby opposing the rest of society on behalf of their
clients, legal professionals expand on this trend by prohibiting conflicts not
only between clients of the same professional, but also conflicts between
clients of multiple professionals in the same firm or office (full
independence).63 Again contrasting these professional roles, while social
workers can assist clients in dealing with powerful government agencies, they,
unlike legal professionals, do not take on a fiduciary duty with regards to the
forcible deprivation of their clients' rights. Legal professionals, whose advice
often serves as a proxy for the state in its imposition of binding law, owe a
heightened duty of loyalty to clients, and the imputation of conflicts is the
keystone to this loyalty.64
Now, it could be argued that legal professionals-namely attorneys--owe
a heightened duty of loyalty because they operate in an adversarial system of
justice.65 However, there is another legal professional that confronts the
forcible deprivation of their clients' property by society's binding rules 66 but
63 Hejmanowski, supra note 46, at 902 ("[T]he doctrine of imputed disqualification
recognizes that if one attorney's loyalty is in jeopardy, the loyalty of all attorneys in the
firm is threatened.").
4 Lawrence J. Fox, All's O.K Between Consenting Adults: Enlightened Rule on
Privacy, Obscene Rule on Ethics, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 701, 728 (2001) ("[I]mputation is
the foundation stone of the legal profession's commitment to the core value of loyalty to
clients. Imputation holds that all lawyers within a given practice setting carry with them
the obligation to uphold the loyalty interests of the clients of every other lawyer in the
practice setting. If any lawyer in the firm or law office is representing A, then no one else
in the firm can take on a matter adverse to A, without A's informed consent."); Fallyn B.
Reichert, "Screening" New York's New Rules-Laterals Remain Conflicted Out, 31 PACE
L. REV. 464, 471 (2011) (citing arguments that "the fiduciary duties of loyalty and
confidentiality are the 'heart of the lawyer-client relationship' and the imputation of
conflicts protects clients, which is the very purpose of the Model Rules").
65 See infra Section I.C.
66 Rimma Tsvasman, A Case for the IRS's Full Compliance with the Administrative
Procedure Act, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 837, 839 (2011) ("[T]he IRS...has power to pass
binding law and adjudicate matters in its own right."); David P. Korteling, Let Me Tell You
How It Will Be; Here's One for You, Nineteen for Me: Modifying the Internal Revenue
Service's Approach to Resolving Tax Disputes, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 659, 676-77 (1994)
("The IRS can issue 'private' or 'letter' rulings (advance rulings), or pre-filing
determination letters, thereby exercising considerable influence over taxpayer behavior
through regulations and through advice it gives to taxpayers preparing returns.").
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does not operate in an adversarial system67-- certified public accountants. If
the elevated duty of loyalty marked by imputed conflict of interest rules were
unique to all legal professionals, and not only zealous, adversarial advocates,
then ethical rules should impute conflicts of interest not only between
attorneys but also between accountants. Because imputation of conflicts
within a firm limits business especially for the accounting mega-firms 68 and
increasingly large law firms,69 both attorneys and accountants would naturally
prefer to not have available business so encumbered. And because accountants
compete with attorneys for the same business7" as played out in the debate over
Multidisciplinary Practices ("MDPs") 71, each will set forth the ethical
restrictions that strike an optimal balance between limiting business for their
67 Tia Breakley, Multidisciplinary Practices: Lawyers & Accountants Under One
Roof?, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 275, 292 (2000) ("[I]t is important to remember that the
nature of conflict in law firms is often very different than that in accounting firms. Conflicts
arising in law firms are often associated with litigation in which significant amounts of
money are at stake. In contrast, conflicts that arise in accounting firms are generally not
adversarial.").
68 See Rees M. Hawkins, Not "lf" but "When" and "How": A Look at Existing De
Facto Multidisciplinary Practices and What They Can Teach Us About the Ongoing
Debate, 83 N.C. L. REV. 481, 482 n.8, 509 (2005) ("[A]s a result of their sheer size,
enforcing imputation in the Big Four [accounting firms] would be nearly impossible....
The Big Five include Ernst & Young LLP, Deloitte & Touche LLP,
PriceWaterhouseCooper, KPMG LLP, and Arthur Andersen LLP. While Arthur Andersen
collapsed in the wake of the Enron scandal, this Comment refers to the Big Five generally,
as all five professional service firms have contributed to the MDP debate. The author only
refers to the Big Four when discussing the current or future impact of these large
professional firms.").
69 See Steven H. Goldberg, The Former Client's Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move
in Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. REV. 227, 228-29 (1987) ("The number of
lawyers in the United States nearly doubled from 355,000 in 1969 to 649,000 in 1984. The
number and size of large law firms grew exponentially.... The traditional conflict of
interest rule, prohibiting representation of adverse interests in the same matter, caused
occasional and inadvertent difficulty for the newly mobile lawyers and the megafirms they
joined and left. The real problem, however, was the successive conflict time
bomb.. .triggered by the imputed disqualification... restriction on a lawyer working against
a former client in a substantially related matter, coupled with application of that
disqualification to all other lawyers in the firm....").
70 See Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90
HARV. L. REV. 702, 707-08 (1977) ("While the variety of competitors confronted by the
Bar has been broad, five or six major areas continue to be the primary source of
controversy: debt collection, preparation of real estate contracts, sale of kits or forms for
divorce or probate, tax counseling, and appearance before specialized administrative
agencies.") (emphasis added).
71 See Kathryn Lolita Yarbrough, Multidisciplinary Practices: Are They Already
Among Us?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 639, 639 (2002).
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professionals and attracting clients from the other profession. As a result, the
battle over whether the ABA would relax its conflict rules or whether the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") would elevate
its conflict rules presented a market determination of clients' demand for
loyalty from professionals handling the forcible deprivation of their property.72
Though the AICPA initially fought against the application of the imputation
doctrine-originally unique to attorney ethics 73-to accounting firms that
employed attorneys, 74 recently the AICPA amended its ethics rules to impute
client conflicts between members in public practice in the same firm.75 The
battle for market control illustrated in the clash between the ABA's and
AICPA's ethics codes clearly demonstrates that clients who confront the
forcible deprivation of their property and rights by the state demand a degree
" See Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in
the Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 87, 87 (2003) ("A long-
standing scholarly tradition regards professions, in general, and ethics rules, in particular,
as 'projects' of market control. It is no surprise, critics charge, that in the latest assault on
the monopoly of the American legal profession-waged by multidisciplinary professional
service firms-lawyers are hiding behind their ethics rules to protect their turf.").
" See Yarbrough, supra note 71, at 654 ("[A]ttomeys impute conflict of interest at the
firm level, which other professions do not...."). See also Robert E. Guillory, Jr., Wide-
Eyed Deer in the Headlights, 47 L.A. B.J. 192, 192 (1999) ("No other profession [other
than attorneys] has the same obligation of loyalty to the client, including imputation of
conflicts to all members of the practice entity.").
" See George C. Nnona, Towards A Reformed Conception of Multidisciplinary
Practice, 56 CLE. ST. L. REv. 533, 556 (2008) ("The AICPA further objects, as clearly
inappropriate and overreaching, to the [ABA's Commission on Multi-Disciplinary
Practices]'s proposal to unilaterally impose the legal rules of conduct on accounting firms
that include lawyers.... The AICPA thus leaves no one in doubt that while it is amenable
and indeed desires the liberalization of the legal profession's restrictions on MDP, it has
no inclination towards accepting the restrictions implicated by the core ethical values
regarding conflicts of interest.").
75 CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT ET § 102.03 Rule 102-2 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCTS. 2014) ("A conflict of interest may occur if a member performs a professional
service for a client...and the member or his/her firm has a relationship with another person,
entity, product, or service that could be viewed as impairing objectivity."); Ethical Issues
Facing Tax Practitioners 203, 211 (ALI-ABA). See also CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT
1.110.101.02 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2014) ("A conflict of interest creates
adverse interest and self-interest threats to the member's compliance with the "Integrity
and Objectivity Rule" [1.100.001]. For example, threats may be created when: a. the
member or the member's firm provides a professional service related to a particular matter
involving two or more clients whose interests with respect to that matter are in conflict, or
b. the interests of the member or the member'sfirm with respect to a particular matter and
the interests of the client for whom the member or the member's firm provides a
professional service related to that matter are in conflict.") (emphasis added).
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of loyalty in which their professional is independent from, and therefore in no
way aligned with, other professionals who are assisting adverse interests.
The driving point of this subsection is that, because they assist clients
against the collective will of the rest of society, experts on binding law must
promise a heightened degree of loyalty to clients by operating independently.
As a result, two sides of a dispute that are likely to invoke the binding power
of law must be guided by independent legal experts. The practical
implications of this point lie in the inverse-when two sides wish to negotiate
and thereby avoid a decision imposed by the state, independent advocates are
not necessary. To be clear, particular disputants may still prefer to bring
independent advocates to a negotiation; however, such an aggressive degree
of loyalty may be obstructive to the free flow of ideas that are characteristic of
productive negotiations. Using the above framework for determining how
loyalty is suited to the professional's role, an expert focusing on interpersonal
conflict outside of the binding impact of law should only be precluded from
assisting multiple clients who have adverse interests. These professionals
would, therefore, not be precluded from operating in the same office or even
working as a team, unlike their legal counterparts who impute such conflicts.
Though independent advocates such as attorneys provide direct support to
disputants in cases that largely end in negotiation, it would appear as though
such independence was only merited when the power of the state was invoked
through pending litigation. If advocates were to focus entirely on negotiation,
and thereby avoid the application of binding law, then such independence
would be unnecessary and even counterproductive. The most obvious
application of this conclusion involves collaborative law-a process in which
two attorneys focus on negotiation by agreeing to withdraw if either party
wishes to proceed to litigation.76 Though many states have recognized the
benefit of negotiation-focused advocacy and allowed collaborative law to
develop, at least one state has decided that this process involves a per se
violation of the strict loyalty owed by attorneys to their clients.77 As this
section suggests, advocates who focus on communication and negotiation
skills rather than the application of binding law should operate under an
entirely different ethic of loyalty. Just as legally trained professionals do not
76 See Stu Webb, Collaborative Law Introduction, 4 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 315
(2004).
77 See Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A
Study in Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 289, 311-12 (2008) ("In 2007, however,
the Colorado Bar Association issued an opinion declaring collaborative practice unethical
per se.... The opinion asserts that CL implicated Rule 1.7(b) because it 'involves an
agreement between the lawyer and a "third person" (i.e., the opposing party) whereby the
lawyer agrees to impair his or her ability to represent the client [by discontinuing] the
representation in the event that the [CL] process is unsuccessful."').
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form attorney-client relationships when acting as mediators, attorneys who
offer negotiation-focused advocacy should not necessarily do so as attorneys.
However, the independence that is required in the face of binding legal
authority is only one example of how protocols designed for attorneys are
misapplied to dispute resolution professionals who focus on negotiation.
Further conventions that specifically demand independence between
advocates include the process of applying binding law and the procedures
required within this system.
B. Unilateral Court Procedures Require Separate Advocates
While the previous section focused on the theoretical power of binding
law to show why experts in this field must be independent, this section draws
a similar conclusion by exploring the practical application of the law through
the court system. Like the previous section, however, the link between
litigation advocacy and independence is identified here to show that advocates
who operate outside of decision-based dispute resolution processes should not
be required to function separately from each other.
To be meaningful, binding law must be applied to members of society.
This application occurs when thejudiciary calls upon legal authority to resolve
disputes between individuals or groups.7" Though this point is too obvious to
receive much attention in the case law or academic literature, the method that
the courts use to apply the law is based upon a decision handed down by a
single judge or a majority of a multiple-judge panel that considers the
information presented by the disputants.
7 9
Just as any process has specific inputs and outputs, the most basic element
of what goes into the judicial process is conflicting stories or interests 80 and
78 See Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987,
2070 n.169 (1999) (citing MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR Ass'N
1990)) ("Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and competent
judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us.").
79 See Hon. Gerald W. Hardcastle, Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family
Court Judge's Perspective, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 57, 58 (2005) ("Reduced to
its essence, the product of judicial institutions is a decision. This much is not disputed....
America has a long commitment to decision-making through the adversarial process.
American judges and lawyers are educated in the adversarial method of dispute
resolution.").
80 See Stephan Wittich, Permissible Derogation from Mandatory Rules? The Problem
of Party Status in the Genocide Case, 18 EuR. J. INT'L L. 591, 608 (2007) ("It is a feature
of procedural law common to any judicial or, for that matter, arbitral procedure that, before
the court or tribunal may deal with the merits of a dispute brought before it, procedural
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the most basic outcome is a final decision that resolves the dispute."1 This
system therefore relies on individuals to initiate and fuel the clash of
perspectives on which the judge will use the power of the state to rule. 2 An
authoritative decision is necessary because consensus is not always possible
and the status quo may be unjust. If consensus were possible, the disputants
would not need a powerful third party decision-maker and would not have
initiated the process. And people who violate interests protected by the law
by following their own self-interests are unlikely to be motivated to change
this behavior without the intervention of a powerful third party decision-
maker. Litigation is therefore the process by which unjust power imbalances
between individuals and violations of binding social norms are raised by the
affected parties and resolved by judicial decision.
8 3
The most basic procedural requirement of the adjudicatory framework for
dispute resolution is that each disputant must be able to proceed separately,
without the agreement of the opposing interest. Compulsory or unilateral
action is therefore the key benefit of litigation. 4 The aggrieved party has a
unilateral right to call upon the power of the state through the judiciary to
consider remedial action.85 So, in seeking assistance with the interpretation
conditions of a general kind must be met. One of these conditions, probably the most
fundamental one, is that the court or tribunal is open to the parties to the dispute.").
8" See Diane S. Kaplan, Immaculate Deception: The Evolving Right of Paternal
Renunciation, 27 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 139, 142 n.36 (2006) (citing 18 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4403 (2d ed. 2002)) ("The central role of adversary litigation in our society is to provide
binding answers.").
2 See Eran B. Taussig, Broadening the Scope of Judicial Gatekeeping: Adopting the
Good Faith Doctrine in Class Action Proceedings, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1275, 1336-38
(2009) (noting that the American and Israeli adversarial "legal systems rely upon private
litigants to enforce substantive provisions of law that, in civil law legal systems, are left
mostly to the discretion of public enforcement agencies," and later noting that "in the
United States the government has increasingly given private citizens the power to bring
lawsuits to enforce statutes").
83 See Timothy P. O'Neill, There Will Be Blame: Misfortune and Injustice in "The
Sweet Hereafter ", 5 DEN. U. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 68, 70 (2008) ("[L]itigation can direct the
community's blame towards the proper parties."). See also Joseph B. Stulberg, Questions,
17 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 531, 534-35 (2002) ("[M]uch like the compulsory nature of
the legal process, mandating mediation rectifies power imbalances among the parties....").
4 See Merrill Shields, Mediation in State Government, COLO. LAW. (Colo. Bar Ass'n,
Denver, Colo.), Oct. 1997, at 19, 24 ("Dispute is best suited to litigation because client
requires public, final, binding, adjudicated resolution (e.g., for purposes of establishing
precedent, appeal, utilizing available procedural safeguards).").
85 See Carolyn D. Schwarz, Unified Family Courts: A Saving Grace for Victims of
Domestic Violence Living in Nations with Fragmented Court Systems, 42 FAM. CT. REV.
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and application of binding legal rights, the aggrieved party must be able to
consult a litigation professional who operates separately and is not beholden
to the opposing interest. And because such action may be initiated under
mistaken facts or improper intent, and because an informed outcome demands
thoughtful participation by both sides, the opposing party should be able to
respond through a similarly separate legal advocate.
The experts that assist disputants within the litigation process must
therefore operate separately, and be able to guide their clients from complaint
to final decision without the approval of the opposing party. In contrast to the
fundamental requirements of important legal rights discussed in the previous
section or the methods by which they fulfill their duties in this process
discussed in the next section, the conclusion in this section is simple and
functional: litigation advocates must be capable of unilateral action in front of
a powerful third-party decision-maker.
This conclusion is important to the overall point of this paper because
advocates can assist disputants in negotiation-based processes that are
functionally different from decision-based processes along all of the above
criteria that require advocates to operate separately. Negotiation is a voluntary
search for a mutual outcome by opposing interests.86 The process is initiated
by both disputants together and requires their continued and voluntary
participation in order to function.8 7 Instead of a debate in front of a powerful
third-party decision-maker, this dialogue is empowered at all levels by both
parties exploring their self-interests in concert. 88 So, while decision-based
processes are only necessary when the parties cannot cooperate, negotiation-
based processes are only possible when the parties are coordinating their
actions. As a result, separate advocates in negotiation may be not only
unwarranted but also obstructive.
304, 309 (2004) ("alternative dispute resolution, are only alternatives to a victim's
unilateral right to adversarial litigation").
6 See Cynthia Alkon, The Cookie Cutter Syndrome: Legal Reform Assistance Under
Post-Communist Democratization Programs, 2002 J. DiSP. RESOL. 327, 347 (2002)
(defining negotiation as "the process by which parties voluntarily seek a mutually
acceptable agreement to resolve their common dispute").
87 See John A. Folk-Williams, The Use of Negotiated Agreements to Resolve Water
Disputes Involving Indian Rights, 28 NAT. REsOURCES J. 63, 72 (1988) ("Negotiation is a
voluntary decisionmaking process in which the parties bargain directly, though not
necessarily face to face, to reach an agreement that is capable of implementation.").
88 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 755 (1984) ("When people negotiate




Disputants who seek individual assistance in a negotiation-based forum,
therefore, misapply a role designed for decision-based processes when they
hire separate advocates. However, as the next section demonstrates, the
methods employed by these litigation-based advocates may be more
obstructive to negotiation than the methods by which they become employed.
C. Adversarial Court Procedures Require Zealously Independent Advocates
While the basic contours of a decision-making body applying binding law
present the foundational reasons for advocates to be independent, it is the
philosophy of the forum that most visibly impacts the relationships among its
advocates. This section will therefore shift the focus from the structure of the
larger system to how the philosophy of the system affects the role of the
advocate. As will be demonstrated below, the particular approach of the
American justice system requires advocates to operate in a manner that is not
conducive to negotiation; however, this approach originates from litigation
and should not guide out-of-court dispute resolution.
Because the process by which the state imposes its power over conflicting
narratives must conform to societal expectations to carry legitimacy,8 9 the
adjudicatory justice system is imbued with important values. 9° In meting out
89 Oma Rabinovich-Einy, Beyond Efficiency: The Transformation of Courts Through
Technology, UCLA J.L. & TECH., Spring 2008, at 1, 12 (describing a change in "the way
in which procedural rules are understood, from technical and dry instructions to important
tools for promoting basic procedural values that are necessary for sustaining the legitimacy
of the litigation process"); Albert Monroe, Rebuilding Justice: A Review of The Collapse
of American Criminal Justice, by William J. Stuntz, 3 WM. & MARY POL'Y REV. 333, 345
(2012) ("Tom Tyler, a professor of law and psychology who has written at length about
legitimacy, states that people accept adverse adjudication proceedings more readily if they
feel that 'the court procedures used to handle their cases are fair."').
90 Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64
IND. L.J. 301, 308 (1989) (stating that "[a]djudication involves the presentation of a dispute
to a decisionmaker who has the authority to render a decision that is binding on the parties
to the dispute" and describing the characteristics necessary for the process to be fair);
Justice William H. Erickson, The History of the Tripod of Justice, 64 MIL. L. REV. 79, 79
(1974) ("Fundamental fairness and verity in the truth-finding process are essential to our
system of justice."); Charles M. Sevilla, Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Search for
Truth, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 519, 519 (1997) ("A system of justice seeking only
factual truth without regard to fairness or other important values would not be a just
system."); Michael A. Newton, Should the United States Join the International Criminal
Court?, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POLY 35, 37 (2002) (stating that, "the only true justice
is a truth-based justice, a fair system of justice that bases its judgment on truth and
facts..."); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 523 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (rhetorically
quoting the majority's assertions that "the 'ultimate goal' of the criminal justice system is
'truth and justice."' Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 n. 30).
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order, truth, and fairness, court systems place specific expectations and
restrictions on the advocates who personally assist disputants in litigation.
91
Because ideas such as truth and fairness are important to the justice system,
court procedures are designed around these values, and because these values
are subjective and inconsistent at times, 92 court procedures can vary among
societies.
For example, a litigation system focused entirely on the search for an
objective truth would remove any impediments to the decision-maker's access
to information. Such a process is exemplified by the inquisitorial justice
system in which the judge dominates the fact-finding process-actively
investigating the evidence and candidly interviewing witnesses prior to trial. 93
Critics of this approach argue that an adjudicatory process conducted entirely
" Shirin Chahal, Balancing the Scales ofJustice: Undercover Investigations on Social
Networking Sites, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 285, 305 (2011) ("In the realm of legal
ethics, all states have adopted rules of professional conduct for lawyers similar to the
standards promulgated by the American Bar Association in its Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.").
92 See G. Kristian Miccio, Giles v. California: Is Justice Scalia Hostile to Battered
Women?, 87 TEX. L. REv. 93, 95 (2009) ("Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, New York's
appellate courts recognize the tension between 'truth' and our conceptions of 'fundamental
fairness.' The courts have consistently held that a trial is not a search for the truth, but
rather a test of what the prosecution can prove and what reasonable doubt the defense can
raise. New York has laid bare the truth here, pardon the pun. A trial is really a search for
reasonable doubt, and truth may, indeed, be a casualty of this process. The salient question
is whether 'truth' and 'fairness' are incompatible or discordant principles within our
adversarial process."); R. Jason Richards, Richards v. Jefferson County: The Supreme
Court Stems the Crimson Tide of Res Judicata, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 691, 742 (1998)
("Truth and justice is a subjective notion; it is intimately personal. As one commentator
put it, 'The process of litigation is a product of the mind."') (quoting Jon Newman,
Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1646
(1985)).
" Sward, supra note 90, at 313 ("[T]wo essential elements of inquisitorial
adjudication are: first, that the judge is primarily responsible for supervising the gathering
of evidence necessary to resolve the issue; and, second, that the decisionmaker is not,
therefore, merely a receptor for information at a neatly packaged trial, but is, instead, an
active participant."); Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to
Lawyers, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1301 (2013) ("The classic inquisitorial model,
historically associated with civil-law countries, empowers a judicial officer, an
investigating magistrate, to proactively frame the issues, investigate a case, and question
witnesses. The parties can thus be much more passive, suggesting leads and lines of inquiry
but not themselves recruiting and questioning the witnesses."); Stephanos Bibas & William
W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59
DuKE L.J. 637, 696-97 (2010) ("[I]n inquisitorial systems, judges and police interview
witnesses well before trial...").
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within the mind of the judge would be unduly influenced by the judge's early
conclusions and personal biases.94 As a reaction to the authoritarian power of
judges conducting both investigation and decision-making, 95 an alternative
"adversarial" model arose in which the decision-maker remains impassive and
allows the disputants to control the investigation and presentation of
evidence. 96 Because the fairness of any adjudicatory system is based primarily
on the decision-maker's ability to be impartial in weighing the conflicting
narratives, 97 participants perceive the adversarial process as fairer than its
inquisitorial counterpart. " Though the inquisitorial criticism of the
adversarial system suggests that relying on party presentation of evidence
leads to distortions and promotes subjective fairness over truth and accuracy,
99
9' Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversary System, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
653, 666 (2007) ("Harvard Professor Lon Fuller famously criticized the inquisitorial
system on neutrality grounds. Fuller argued that a judge who is involved in framing the
issues and choosing witnesses prior to the trial would decide prematurely which side was
correct and downgrade evidence to the contrary. In contrast, Fuller argued, the passive
judge in an adversarial trial is likely to remain neutral until all the evidence is in."); Fabio
L6pez-Lhzaro, "No Deceit Safe in Its Hiding Place": The Criminal Trial in Eighteenth-
Century Spain, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 449, 458 (2002) ("Nineteenth-century reformers like
Sagasta were fond of portraying old-fashioned courts as despotic because the judges had
both investigative and adjudicatory powers.").
95 See e.g., Stephan A. Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary
System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 724-25 (1983).
96 Unlike inquisitorial civil lawjudges, who may instruct parties to produce documents
in their possession, examine witnesses, and appoint experts, the paradigmatic common law
court is passive and relies exclusively on the adversary process. Only the litigants, seeking
to convince the court, are supposed to provide the court with the necessary information.
See Eran B. Taussig, Broadening the Scope of Judicial Gatekeeping: Adopting the Good
Faith Doctrine in Class Action Proceedings, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1275, 1297 (2009).
17 Sward, supra note 90, at 308 ("All systems of adjudication that could be
characterized as 'fair' must have certain additional features.... First, the decisionmaker
must be impartial."); Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on Zealous Representation in an
Adversarial System, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 674 (1997) ("In the ideal model of the
adversarial system, impartial decisionmakers-judge,jury, or some combination thereof-
render decisions based on evidence presented by competent advocates zealously
representing their clients' interests in accordance with established rules."); see also Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 510 (1927) (finding that a "judge having a direct, personal,
substantial interest in convicting [a criminal defendant] is a denial of due process of law").
98 JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 73 (1975) (describing an empirical study comparing adversary and inquisitorial
systems and finding that parties in the adversary system are more satisfied overall, think
they are "treated more humanely and with greater dignity," and believe adversary
procedure to be relatively fair).
99 Paul L. Seave, And Nothing but the Truth: A Review of Judge Rothwax's "Guilty:
The Collapse of Criminal Justice", 28 PAC. L.J. 533, 540 (1997) ("[O]ur adversarial system
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empirical studies have shown that the adversarial system is better equipped to
counteract the decision-maker's personal biases °. and tendency to decide a
matter before all of the evidence has been presented.'
The theory behind the adversarial model of adjudication is that
competition between stakeholders in presenting evidence in front of an
impartial decision-maker will produce a thorough, well-wrought, and fair
decision.1 2 Arguably, this dialectic of conjecture and refutation will filter out
inaccuracies, debate the merits of each perspective, and point to the best
approximation of the truth. 103 Thus, not only is unrestrained advocacy
protective of the impartiality of the process,0 4 it also arguably produces ideal
outcomes in decision-based processes.
105
in its attention to fairness has spawned excesses-most notably, an excessive tolerance of
efforts by the contestants to distort the truth.") (quoting JUDGE HAROLD J. ROTHWAX,
GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 130 (1996)); Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37 MERCER L. REv. 647, 651 (1986) ("The
American adversary system is misdescribed as a search for truth..."); Fred C. Zacharias,
Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44
VAND. L. REV. 45, 56 (1991) ("Fairness and respect for client individuality play an equal
part, even though full assertion of client rights may interfere with truth-seeking.").
1°Asimow, supra note 94, at 667 (describing Thibaut and Walker's experiment which
concluded that "[w]hen the judge was not 'biased,' the conviction rates were the same
whether an adversarial or inquisitorial trial occurred. Where the judge was biased,
however, the judge was more likely to convict the defendant in an inquisitorial rather than
an adversarial trial.").
'0' As a case is presented, the adversary mode apparently counteracts judge or juror
bias in favor of a given outcome and thus indeed seems to combat, in Fuller's words, a
"tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known."
Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 383 (1978).
"02 Ann Southworth, Redefining the Attorney's Role in Abusive Tax Shelters, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 889, 910 (1985) ("The adversarial model of justice postulates that an adversarial
proceeding, in which both parties to a conflict advocate their own interests before an
impartial judge, produces a record as complete and results as fair as any to be expected
from formal adjudication.").
103 Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589,
595 (1985) ("The premise is that 'truth' or the 'right' result is attainable through
competitive presentations of relevant factual and legal considerations. Paralleling Karl
Popper's concept of scientific rationality, the theory assumes that knowledge will emerge
through a dialectic of conjecture and refutation.").
"0 Fuller, supra note 101, at 382 ("In a very real sense it may be said that the integrity
of the adjudicative process itself depends upon the participation of the advocate. This
becomes apparent when we contemplate the nature of the task assumed by any arbiter who
attempts to decide a dispute without the aid of partisan advocacy. Such an arbiter must
undertake, not only the role of judge, but that of representative for both of the litigants.").
105 Rhode, supra note 26, at 596 ("The institution of advocacy is not a concession to the
frailties of human nature, but an expression of human insight in the design of a social framework
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Because partisan advocacy is the engine driving the adversarial process,
0 6
legal structures based on this model encourage an active role for the advocate
that is distinct from the passive role of thejudge. 1°7 With an adversarial client-
focused system rooted in values such as competition and individualism, s0 8 the
role for attorneys traditionally favored in the American justice system is the
zealous advocate.0 9 Note that the theoretical foundation for zealous advocacy
is tied directly to the adjudicatory system, rendering such an approach to be
superfluous and perhaps harmful to non-adjudicatory processes.
The ideal of zealous advocacy involves the aggressive, unrestrained
assertion of individual perspectives, arguments, and rights." 0 Because the
within which man's capacity for impartial judgment can attain its fullest realization."); Lon L.
Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44
A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958) (arguing that a decision maker can best reach an impartial
judgment when the issues have been presented with "intelligent and vigorous advocacy").
106 Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 54 (1991) ("Partisan advocacy enables
judges and juries to see controversies from the litigants' perspectives; it ensures that fact
finders will not overlook obscure but relevant information.").
107 Carrie Menkei-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No
Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV.
407, 425 (1997) ("Current legal ethics codes assume a clear distinction (based on our
adversary system) between the advocates and the neutral, impartial and passive decision-
maker who operates at arms-length from the parties.").
108 SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED
SwORD 108 (1996) ("The American social structure and values foster the free market and
competitive individualism..."); Herbert Jacob, Courts and Politics in the United States, in
COURTS, LAW, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 16, 29 (Herbert Jacob et al.
eds., 1996) ("[T]he legal system in the United States reflects core values of the nation's
political and legal tradition, particularly an emphasis on individual rights, a focus on
constitutionalism of proposed actions, limited government, and aspirations of
egalitarianism."); Carolyn Jin-Myung Oh, Questioning the Cultural and Gender-Based
Assumptions of the Adversary System: Voices of Asian-American Law Students, 7
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 125, 126 (1992) ("The American values of free-market
competition, decentralized and minimized government intervention, and laissez-faire
economics are mirrored in the adversary process.").
" Paula Schaefer, Harming Business Clients with Zealous Advocacy: Rethinking the
Attorney Advisor's Touchstone, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 253 (2011) ("In the United
States, lawyers, commentators, and courts understand "zealous advocacy" to be the
lawyer's highest duty..."); Zacharias, supra note 106, at 54 ("[T]he assumption is that
aggressive, competitive lawyering, guided exclusively by client interests, produces
appropriate results.").
10 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983) ("As
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary
system"); id at r. 3.1 cmt. I ("The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest
benefit of the client's cause."); Carol Rice Andrews, Ethical Limits on Civil Litigation
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thoroughness and fairness of the adjudication is measured in the degree to
which opposing advocates clash in the investigation and presentation of
evidence, maximal advocacy in front of an impassive judge theoretically leads
to an optimal decision."' Zealous advocacy is therefore designed to be the
foundation of a superior decision-making process. Though zealousness is
intended to benefit the adjudicatory process, 1 2 the concept of zealousness also
creates benign guidance for the advocates that operate within it. While a
system that requires restraint in the enforcement of social norms would have
to define the socially acceptable amount of effort in applying these norms,
unrestrained zeal is simple ... and uniformly regulates conduct through
counteracting checks and balances. 114 This simple and uniform ethic is
beneficial within a system in which justice depends on equal treatment under
the law, but would be unnecessary in a direct interaction between disputants
informally applying their personal sense of fairness. As a further measure of
the "purity" of the adversarial system," 5 the superseding loyalty owed by
Advocacy: A Historical Perspective, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 381, 386 (2012) ("Zealous
advocacy requires competence, confidentiality, and loyalty, but to most observers, it means
something more. Zealous advocacy suggests a push for excellence. Zealous advocacy, to
some observers, requires a strong desire to win and a willingness to 'do all' to accomplish
the client's goals. It suggests a primacy of the client's interests, perhaps above all others.").
.. Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693, 734-35
(1994) ("For legal ethics, strict client devotion is said to be demanded by the adversarial system
of adjudication, which is designed to arrive at the optimal determination ofjustice via a contest
of competing extremes. The lawyer's single-minded pursuit is counterbalanced by the opposing
lawyer's equally zealous advocacy and the neutral role that the judge and jury play as the
ultimate arbiters of the merits of the competing arguments.").
12 Andrews, supra note 110, at 427 ("Ethical Consideration 7-19 explained the
rationale for zealous advocacy: 'the advocate, by his zealous preparation and presentation
of facts and law, enables the tribunal to come to the hearing with an open and neutral mind
and to render impartial judgments."').
..3 Schaefer, supra note 109, at 288 ("Zealous advocacy's great advantage is that it is
simple.").
"4 Zacharias, supra note 106, at 55-56 ("Adversarial process.. .creates a system of
checks and balances. The attorneys keep an eye on one another and on the judge to make
sure that they all perform their assigned roles in proper and ethical fashion.").
..5 Frederick R. Franke, Jr., Perfect Ambiguity: The Role of the Attorney in Maryland
Guardianships, 7 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 223, 234 (1996) ("Under a pure adversarial
model, the attorney for a guardian owes the guardian, not the ward, his or her undivided loyalty.
If a guardian informs the guardian's attorney that the guardian had misappropriated funds, the
attorney has no duty to the ward under pure adversarial rules."); Gerald W. Boston, Liability of
Attorneys to Nonclients in Michigan: A Re-Examination of Friedman v. Dozorc and A Rule of
Limited Liability, 68 U. DET. L. REv. 307, 353-54 (1991) ("While one commentator advocates
that liability for negligence to third parties should never be permitted because a no-duty rule
would force third parties to retain their own counsel who can represent their interests with
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attorneys to their clients prevents any of the parties' viewpoints from being
overshadowed by the advocates' own personal values 16 or allegiance to the
court."' This narrow focus on the client is important when an advocate speaks
as a representative of the client and the judge issues a binding decision based
on those representations, but would be less important if the client controlled
the conduct and outcome of the process, as in negotiation-based processes.
As a result of the clash of perspectives required in adjudication, the checks
and balances creating uniform treatment under the law, and the need to focus on
respective clients' voices in a process in which they may not speak, this advocacy
role is built on unhindered competition between opposing advocates." 8 Any
overarching loyalties between adversaries would reduce effectiveness and call
into question the propriety of the process. "9 As a result, close relationships
between adversaries would seem to obstruct adversarial litigation. 2 ' Thus, the
undivided loyalty and would result in better lawyering, that approach seems most appropriate
in the pure adversarial context of litigation.").
116 Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal
Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951,963-64 (1991)
("In the ideal adversary system reflected by the ethical codes, the lawyer does not sit in
judgment of the client's cause.").
117 Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 76
(1989) ("Lawyers, frankly, are not obligated to serve as officers of the court in any
meaningful sense. Whether in the ethical or nondisciplinary context, the law applicable to
lawyers leans conclusively, if not exclusively, in favor of the lawyer's duty to the client.")
118 Oh, supra note 108, at 126 (noting that "the American legal model, including the 'rules
of the game,' fosters competition between largely autonomous and self-interested, zealous
advocates in a winner-take-all scheme"); Symposium, Teaching a New Paradigm: Must
Knights Shed Their Swords and Armor to Enter Certain ADR Arenas?, I CARDOZO ONLINE J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (2000) [hereinafter Teaching a New Paradigm) ("The old paradigm was
that a lawyer's duty of zealous advocacy required an exclusively competitive ethic.").
119 This is the rationale behind MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (AM. BAR.
Ass'N 2014), which prevents two attorneys with overarching loyalties to the same firm
from representing opposing parties.
1 0 See, e.g, Stacy DeBroff, Lawyers As Lovers: How Far Should Ethical Restrictions
on Dating or Married Attorneys Extend?, I GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 433 (1987) (despite the
well-reasoned recommendation in this note, ethical rules do not address situations in which
opposing attorneys are engaged in an emotional relationship); accord Robert H. Aronson,
An Overview of the Law of Professional Responsibility: The Rules of Professional Conduct
Annotated and Analyzed, 61 WASH. L. REV. 823, 901 n.126 (1986) (citing People v.
Jackson, 167 Cal. App. 3d 829, 832-33 (1985) where "the court reversed a conviction of
assault with intent to commit rape because defense counsel was dating the prosecutor....
'Such an apparently close relationship between counsel directly opposing each other in a
criminal prosecution naturally and reasonably gives rise to speculation that the professional
judgment of counsel as well as the zealous representation to which an accused is entitled
has been compromised."')); see Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d
225,235-36 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Canon 4 as a basis for disqualifying the attorney because
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
adversarial system of justice hinges on independence between opposing
advocates. 2'
Like the previous sections that reveal the link between adjudication of
legal rights and a necessary disconnect between opposing advocates, this
section demonstrates that advocates are required to be independent in the
context of litigation. Once again, the key insight of this analysis is that
zealousness, like independence and separateness, only makes sense in the
context of litigation.
D. Divorcing Advocacy from Adjudication
The link between the advocate's zealous independence and the process of
adjudication is important to identify for a number of reasons. First, advocacy
is useful to disputants in contexts outside of the full and formal litigation of
legal rights, making zealous combativeness potentially unnecessary in those
contexts. Just as advocates trained in the law can guide litigants through court
procedures, so can advocates trained in the art of negotiation guide individual
disputants through dispute resolution.'22 And, because effective negotiation
requires knowledge of complex theories
123 and involves nuanced skill,124
of a close relationship with opposing counsel). See also Susan R. Martyn, Are We Moving
in the Right Dimension? Sadducees, Two Kingdoms, Lawyers, and the Revised Model of
Professional Conduct, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 121,158 n.187 (1999) ("Attorneys are expected
to maintain personal relationships with other attorneys, but must be sensitive to the threat
to independent judgment and the appearance of impropriety when an intimate relationship
exists with opposing counsel or others involved in the proceedings.").
121 George Hampel & Jonathan Clough, Giannarelli v. Wraith, 24 MELB. U. L. REV.
1016, 1021 (2000) ("The adversarial system, it is argued, relies to a large extent on counsel
exercising independent judgment in the conduct of a case.").
122 Lucy S. McGough, Protecting Children in Divorce: Lessons from Caroline Norton
Edward S. Godfrey Scholar-in-Residence Lecture, 57 ME. L. REV. 13, 37 n.83 (2005)
("Collaborative law is...a particularly useful option for a parent who is reluctant to mediate
because he or she fears the other spouse, feels disempowered, and needs the benefit of an
advocate and adviser in the room as settlement negotiations proceed.").
123 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J.
1789 (2000); accord John Lande, A Framework for Advancing Negotiation Theory:
Implications from A Study of How Lawyers Reach Agreement in Pretrial Litigation, 16
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 2 (2014) ("To provide a snapshot of contemporary legal
negotiation theory, this Article analyzes nine law school negotiation textbooks.") (citation
omitted). See also ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1983).
124 Roy J. Lewicki, Seven Teaching Challenges for Business School ADR, 16
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 113 (1998) ("[N]egotiation is not one single skill;
rather, effective negotiation is a complex collection of skill elements that entails aspects of
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professionals trained in negotiation provide benefits within negotiations that
extend beyond mere personal support.
Second, the connection between attorney independence and litigation is
important because not every disputant who seeks the legal insights of an
attorney actually desires a fully litigated outcome.'25 Attorneys often address
situations that, after analyzing the legal rights and likely outcomes of
litigation, they determine are not appropriate for court action.' 26 This reality
is apparent in the vast majority of legal cases that settle prior to trial,
challenging the overall appropriateness of the adversarial paradigm 127
especially as applied to pre-litigation processes. 128 And, third, the link
planning, strategizing, advocacy, communication, persuasion, and cognitive packaging and
repackaging of information.").
125 Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Domino Effect: The Continued Existence of Liability
for Fraud in Bankruptcy Despite Good-Faith Settlement by the Honestly Unfortunate
Settlor, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 81, 123 (2003) ("[T]he courts fail to consider the realities of
settlement and the desire of the parties to avoid litigation."). E.g., Note, Daring the Courts:
Trial and Bargaining Consequences of Minimum Penalties, 90 YALE L.J. 597, 606 (1981)
("The legal debate over negotiated settlements has tended to focus on the desirability of
pretrial bargaining apart from considerations of cost to the parties or the possible desire of
parties to avoid trial for reasons other than cost saving."); accord, Robert E. Couhig et. al.,
Mcdermott v. Amclyde: A Path Towards a Proportionate Fault Rule in Section 905 (b)
Actions, 19 TUL. MAR. L.J. 283, 299 (1995) (citing a United States Supreme Court decision
that acknowledges "[t]he parties' desire to avoid litigation costs, to reduce uncertainty, and
to maintain ongoing commercial relationships").
126 Michele Corvi, Overcoming Challenges in Counseling Divorce Clients, in
STRATEGIES FOR FAMILY LAW IN CALIFORNIA (2011) ("1 always explain the costs of
litigation to my clients at the beginning of the case, and ask them whether litigating is
worth it, because you could be fighting over an asset that is worth very little money. At the
end of the day, if you are going to be spending more in attorney's fees than the sum at
which the assets in the case are valued, litigation is probably not appropriate."). See, e.g.,
Terry Ann Halbert & Lewis Maltby, Reference Check Gridlock: A Proposalfor Escape, 2
EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 395, 414 n.72 (1998) (recounting a phone interview in which
"plaintiffs' attorney Paul Tobias acknowledged that, while his office can provide certain
services-writing letters, obtaining small settlements, for example-in about 95% of cases
'going to court is not appropriate because it isn't a practical solution"').
127 Rhode, supra note 102, at 599 ("Since close to 90% of all civil cases are settled
prior to trial, and relatively little of lawyers' advocacy occurs in the presence of impartial
adjudicators, the adversary paradigm offers an inadequate foundation for the partisanship
role.") (citation omitted).
128 Teaching a New Paradigm, supra note 118 ("The old paradigm was that a lawyer's
duty of zealous advocacy required an exclusively competitive ethic.... But we have known
for a long time that approximately ninety percent of the cases settle before trial. Thus, the
question becomes, 'What ethic should govern the behaviors of the lawyers in the pre-trial
processes, in which the vast majority of cases are resolved."'). See generally Wayne D.
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between zealous advocacy and litigation is important because the ethos of
zealousness was designed under a legal atmosphere that fostered amicable
relations among opposing attorneys. This last point will be demonstrated and
explored in the next part.
To conclude this part, inherent aspects of the application of binding law,
unilateral court action, and adversarial adjudication all specifically require that
opposing advocates operate independently of each other. However, advocacy
may be useful outside of the context of court actions and, as the following
subpart reveals, independence between opposing advocates can be obstructive
to non-legal advocacy.
HI. THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA, NEGOTIATION, AND ADVOCACY
While the previous subpart demonstrated that independence between
advocates is only necessary in the context of courtroom litigation and legal
advice, this section will demonstrate that such independence can be
counterproductive in other contexts and detrimental to the broader system.
This point will be explained with a game theory model that addresses
cooperation-competition dynamics and then illustrated through the impact of
relationships on negotiation-based and adjudication-based advocacy.
A. The Prisoner's Dilemma and Relationships Between Opposing Advocates
Because relationships between opposing advocates can be complicated
and nuanced on the individual level, the effect of independence on advocate
behavior in general will be best examined through the game theory model of
the Prisoner's Dilemma. By distilling conflict between autonomous, self-
interested decision-makers into simple choices with quantifiable outcomes,
game theory studies strategy in light of opposing strategies (i.e., "What is the
optimal response to the opponent's optimal decision?").' 29 The Prisoner's
Dilemma is an application of game theory that explores incentives between
two individuals who can either cooperate or compete with each other. This
Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change,
31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978).
129 Jonathan R. Cohen, Reasoning Along Different Lines: Some Varied Roles of
Rationality in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 111, 112
(1998) ("[G]ame theory, by definition, concerns interdependent decision making."). See,
e.g., Charles J. Stiegler, Offering Monetary Rewards to Public Whistleblowers: A Proposal
for Attacking Corruption at Its Source, 9 01110 ST. J. CRM. L. 815, 820 n. 16 (2012) ("This
is a simple definition of game theory, which posits that a rational person in deciding how




well-respected model illustrates four possible outcomes of this dynamic: the
two players both cooperate and create mutual gains, the two players both
compete and do not create mutual gains, the first player cooperates and is taken
advantage of by the competitive opponent, or the first player competes to take
advantage of the cooperative second player. Ranked from best to worst, the
order of these outcomes is: competing when the opponent cooperates, mutual
cooperation, mutual competition, and cooperating when the opponent
competes. Rather than being a merely abstract scheme, the Prisoner's
Dilemma offers an omnipresent observation of strategic behavior in
conflicts-that being protective, aggressive, and distrustful (competitive)
garners disproportionate gains over an opponent who is open, honest, and
accommodating (cooperative). And, while a multifaceted human interaction
involves more than one binary choice by each side, such realistic dynamics are
composed of individual decisions and underlying strategies that are either
cooperative or competitive.
Though the choice refined from the Prisoner's Dilemma model appears to
be subject to the personalities and value systems of the players involved,
economists would point out that there is only one rational choice under this set
of incentives: competition. This conclusion is apparent in a comparison
between each of an individual's outcomes in light of the opponent's choice. If
the opponent cooperates, the individual will receive a better outcome by using
competitive moves to obtain marginal benefits, and if the opponent competes,
the individual will receive a better outcome through the protection of mutually
competitive tactics. Not only does each player receive a better outcome by
competing regardless of the opponent's move, but each player also knows that
the opponent is facing the same incentives. As a result, the only rational move
under a single game is to compete.
However, the Prisoner's Dilemma model offers another more optimistic
insight. While single-shot interactions promote competitive moves, if the
game were to be repeated indefinitely, then the incentives shift.'30 When both
players know that the game will repeat without foreseeable end, mutual
cooperation offers infinitely recurring positive gains while competitive moves
offer marginal gain in one interaction, but then a descent to repeated null gains
30 Francis Fukuyama, Differing Disciplinary Perspectives on the Origins of Trust, 81
B.U. L. REv. 479, 485-86 (2001) ("The reason why tit-for-tat works as a solution to the
prisoner's dilemma can be understood in commonsensical non-game theoretic terms. If one
faces a decision of trusting another person whom one does not know and will never see
again, one is likely to be cautious because there are insufficient grounds for trust. On the
one hand, repeated interaction allows people to build reputations, either for honesty or
betrayal. Those in the latter category will be shunned, while those in the former category
will gravitate toward working with one another. Honesty is therefore (usually) the best
policy.").
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through retaliatory competitive moves. Thus, when the promise of future
benefits through ongoing cooperation looms over the Prisoner's Dilemma, the
rational move for each player is to cooperate.
The lesson of the Prisoner's Dilemma is that the duration of the
relationship between opposing interests can control the tension between
cooperation and competition. Practical examples of this lesson include
therapists who are better able to elicit the trust and openness needed for
psychological improvement by consistently counseling the same clients over
time... and savvy businesspeople who foster long-term interactions for the
benefits that come with mutual reliance.'32 The flipside of this dynamic occurs
when dictatorial regimes rotate prison guards to prevent captors from
developing sympathy with captives" and armies engaged in World War I
trench warfare learned to rotate troops to mitigate the placidity that developed
from reciprocal "live and let live" actions.1 4 Therefore, systems that require
competitive behavior should limit reciprocity between adversaries and
systems that desire cooperation should be built on continuous interaction.
' John C. Norcross & Michael J. Lambert, Evidence-Based Therapy Relationships,
in PSYCHOTHERAPY RELATIONSHIPS THAT WORK: EVIDENCE BASED RESPONSIVENESS
(John C. Norcross ed., 2d ed. 2011) ("The results of these 20+ meta-analyses converge into
a series of research-supported conclusions with important implications for
psychotherapists and clients alike: The therapy relationship makes substantial and
consistent contributions to patient success in all types of psychotherapy studied (for
example, psychodynamic, humanistic, cognitive, behavioral, systemic). The therapy
relationship accounts for why clients improve (or fail to improve) as much as the particular
treatment method. Practice and treatment guidelines should address therapist qualities and
behaviors that promote the therapy relationship.") (citation omitted).
132 K. Vinayagamoorthy, Apologies in the Marketplace, 33 PACE L. REV. 1081, 1085
(2013) ("Business relationships matter immensely in a variety of commercial settings. In
these situations, parties place value on their business relationship that is independent and
in addition to the pecuniary benefits they gain from exchanging with each other.").
133 Lawrence G. Baxter, "Capture" in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It
Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 196 (2011)
("[T]ransference is the reason that dictatorial regimes rotate their prison guards-lest these
guards begin to develop too great a sympathy for their prisoners.").
134 See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 73-87 (1984)
(describing cooperation that developed over time between soldiers in opposing trenches
and how military leaders attempted to mitigate this cooperation by rotating troops); accord,
Douglas W. Allen, Compatible Incentives and the Purchase of Military Commissions, 27
J. LEGAL STUD. 45, 54 n.30 (1998) ("Gordon Tullock, Methodological Individualism under
Fire, 8 J. ECON BEH & ORG 627 (1987), provides another striking example. Apparently it
is well known in the military that most soldiers in twentieth-century battles failed to fire
their weapons. Tullock interprets this as a Prisoner's Dilemma application since firing a
weapon draws attention to your position and intentions and, therefore, increases the chance
of being shot at. Hence the dominant strategy is to sit quietly in a protected spot and wait.").
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B. Application of Prisoner's Dilemma Lessons to Types ofAdvocacy
These dynamics are present in the requirements and relationships of
advocates in both litigation and negotiation. The differing goals of these
processes thereby lead to different relationship structures that are ideal for
advocates in each process.
As a process that relies on adversarial efforts of opposing attorneys to
produce a thorough and well-argued decision, litigation must encourage
advocates to be competitive.'35 Collusive settlement negotiations or tit-for-tat
accords intended to avoid the hassle of adjudication would work to the
detriment of clients with valid legal rights. 36 If the decision to pursue legal
action was based on litigation costs incurred for both sides, (i.e., litigation
would not be pursued if the process would cost both sides more than it would
benefit either) wrongdoers would be free to cause damage that was just under
the parties' combined litigation expense.137 Adjudication of legal rights is
thereby best served by strong attorney-client relationships and limited
attorney-attorney relationships. 3 8 A strong relationship between opposing
135 Phyllis E. Bernard, The Administrative Law Judge as a Bridge Between Law and
Culture, 23 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 34 (2003) ("Justice, fairness, a re-
balancing of power, transparency and accountability are typically seen as the best products
of a formal adjudicatory process. Litigation achieves these results through the competitive
clash of attorneys...."); Ann Southworth, Redefining the Attorney's Role in Abusive Tax
Shelters, 37 STAN. L. REv. 889, 910 (1985) ("The adversarial model of justice postulates
that an adversarial proceeding, in which both parties to a conflict advocate their own
interests before an impartial judge, produces a record as complete and results as fair as any
to be expected from formal adjudication.").
136 Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, 101 VA.
L. REV. 129, 177 (2015) ("When participation in an out-of-court dispute resolution system
(whether an aggregate settlement, mandatory arbitration, or corporate settlement mill) bars
access to private litigation, parties deserve heightened process to protect their legal
rights."). See, e.g., Sally Lloyd-Bostock, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Civil Justice
Reform: Is ADR Being Used to Paper Over Cracks?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 397,
401-02 (1996) ("Mediation can place very strong psychological pressure on claimants to
settle for less than the amount a court would award. In what sense is this a 'good thing?' It
is clear that a priority for the Health Service is to reduce the costs to itself of medical
negligence claims. But, should the courts systematically support low settlement and the
undermining of legal rights?").
137 Griffith, supra note 39, at 353 ("In other words, everyone pays the wasteful $10,
the aggregate effect of which may be to make it unfeasible to assert claims worth less than
$10. Under this example, tortfeasors, breachers of contract, and other wrongdoers may
freely impose up to $10 worth of harm because, below that threshold, the victim will not
seek to enforce her legal rights.").
13 John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215, 232 (1983) ("The
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
advocates is therefore antithetical to the requirements and goals of litigated
interactions. 13 9
Naturally, the adjudicatory system creates pro-competition Prisoner's
Dilemma dynamics between opposing attorneys by limiting the reciprocity
created by ongoing interaction. Because the "appearance of impropriety"
between chummy opposing attorneys was overly subjective and prone to abuse
in application, 4' legal ethics rules limit relationships between adversaries by
forbidding attorneys in one firm from representing opposing parties.14' More
importantly, the pro-competition dynamic results from attorneys operating
independently, and the effect this has on the manner in which clients hire and
pay for them. Because they choose attorneys separately and are each under
incentive to choose an attorney who will "win" the litigation,' 42 disputants
have Prisoner's Dilemma incentives to choose aggressive attorneys, and
attorneys experience financial and reputational incentives to enhance conflict
rather than resolve it.143 Furthermore, because attorneys operate solely on the
possibility of collusive settlements grows in direct proportion to the attorney's
'independence' from his client.").
'9 Jeffrey Krivis, The Truth About Using Deception in Mediation, 20 ALT. TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 121, 121 (2002) ("While candor and honesty are preferred when parties are
concerned about continuing relationships, it is unrealistic to expect litigators to be candid
when the goal is to get as much as they can for their clients.").
140 Hejmanowski, supra note 41, at 903 ("One problem with the appearance-of-
impropriety standard is the issue of who ought to judge the appearance of impropriety.").
141 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.10 (AM. BAR ASs'N 1983).
142 Griffith, supra note 39, at 352 ("Clients want to win. Because clients pay lawyers
to win, and because prestige in the legal profession is often measured by the ability of
lawyers to win, lawyers are motivated by profit and prestige, sometimes overwhelmingly,
to win."). See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,
18 (1998) ("Clients value winning, not zealous advocacy for its own sake.").
143 Gary Mendelsohn, Lawyers as Negotiators, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 139, 139
(1996) ("Consciously or not, lawyers may prolong their clients' conflict for financial or
reputational reasons."). See, e.g., William G. Hyland Jr., Attorney Advertising and the
Decline of the Legal Profession, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 339, 345-46 (2011); accord, John A.
Devault, 111-, Guess What, You're Not Ticked Off at the Bar, But..., 70 FLA. BAR J. 12, 12-
14 (1996) ("1 believe that the current unpopularity of lawyers has been brought about by
increased commercialism of the profession, including misleading and distasteful
advertising, and by the arrogant and aggressive behavior of lawyers toward each other,
toward their clients, and toward others involved in the litigation process."). See, Mary
Whisner, The 4-1-1 on Lawyer Directories, 106 LAW LIBR. J. 257, 265 (2014) ("Lawyers
in private practice and law firms have incentives to have good profiles so that clients can
find them and hire them."). See also, Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal
Profession, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 173, 186-87 (2008) ("Yellow page and media
advertisements, for example, frequently characterize lawyers' characteristics (e.g.,
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legal fees and goodwill from their clients, each attorney must focus entirely on
the needs of their respective client to maintain employment. 144 As a system
that is best served by clashes between opponents, the legal system has rightly
structured independence between advocates to incentivize competition in
attracting, retaining, and fighting for clients.
However, in terms of cooperation-competition dynamics, negotiation is a
fundamentally opposite process from litigation. While both involve a
confrontation of opposing interests, litigation is a contest of perspectives while
negotiation is a synthesis of perspectives. As a process defined by voluntary
decision-making, negotiation only results in a productive outcome when the
participants entice each other into an agreeable exchange.1 45 Because the
process is composed of free disclosures of information, alternating proposals,
and the mutual coming together of the participants, negotiation is an inherently
cooperative endeavor. Under the Prisoner's Dilemma analysis in the above
subsection, this cooperative orientation would indicate that the ideal
relationship between negotiators is an ongoing interaction.
Basic characteristics and accepted observations support the idea that a
continuous relationship between adversaries enhances the negotiation process.
Ongoing relationships allow opponents to build the trust that supports
cooperative exchanges. 46 Not only do relationships enhance comfort, but the
assurance of future interaction will deter behaviors that would sour the
relationship 147 and allow cooperators to gravitate together, identifying and
'aggressive,' 'pit bull,' 'heavy hitter') ... as a means of establishing the lawyers'
competence and quality.").
Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. L.J. 1529,
1552 (1995) ("If clients have meaningful choice to continue with their present attorney or
to choose a new attorney (i.e., sufficient financial resources, information, experience, and
lack of complete legal vulnerability), those clients are, in turn, able to influence-as
distinguished from determine-their attorney's conduct, the quality of her work, and the
outcome achieved.").
"' Menkel-Meadow, supra note 88, at 755 ("When people negotiate they engage in a
particular kind of social behavior; they seek to do together what they cannot do alone.").
146 R. William Ide Ill & Douglas H. Yarn, Public Independent Fact-Finding: A Trust-
Generating Institution for an Age of Corporate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56 VAND.
L. REV. 1113, 1119 (2003) ("One way interpersonal or mutual trust develops between
individuals is through repeated interactions that allow the actors to generalize the
expectation of continued cooperative behavior in subsequent interactions.").
147 Van N. Nguy, Using Architectural Constraints and Game Theory to Regulate
International Cyberspace Behavior, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 431, 462 (2004) ("[W]hen
interaction between players is repeated, a player is willing to forego all gains in one game
in order to receive higher gains in subsequent games, if the overall gain is greater. For
example, suppose Player X wins in round I by lying, and the penalties for lying are
insufficient. If the relationship is repeated, then Player X may choose to be honest in round
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avoiding dishonest players.1 48 These incentives are especially important in
negotiation 149 because, unlike litigation, the process is too informal to be
amenable to overarching rules and oversight restricting unfair behaviors. 5° In
fact, the need to preserve an amicable working relationship, created through
the expectation of future interactions, can serve as an ethical yardstick for both
sides, promoting selfless moves and preventing deception. "' Though a
strengthened relationship between advocates brings to mind improper
collusion, such would be the case only when the advocates are tasked with a
combative contest over truth and justice, not a voluntary exchange of positions
and ideas.
There is nothing new in the idea that an ongoing relationship improves
negotiation. Axelrod's study of how future interactions can cast a shadow
back on the present is one of the most well-known writings on dispute
resolution and echoed by other early leaders in the field.'52 It has therefore
1 if total gains from round I and 2 together are greater if Player X benefits from the
reputation of being honest than from lying in round 1.... Reputation makes threats to
punish credible.").
148 Fukuyama, supra note 130, at 485-86 ("[R]epeated interaction allows people to
build reputations, either for honesty or betrayal. Those in the latter category will be
shunned, while those in the former category will gravitate toward working with one
another. Honesty is therefore (usually) the best policy.").
149 Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers' Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The
End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV.
475, 482 (2005) ("Deception only works if undetected, however, and therefore deceivers
try to appear trustworthy and forthright. In game-theoretic terms, such second-level
deception (i.e., deception about deception) creates a sorting or signaling problem. A
negotiator must try to determine the 'type' of her counterpart-is the counterpart an honest,
collaborative type or a more hard-bargaining, deceptive type? The counterpart, meanwhile,
may be sending off misleading signals about his type. He may present himself as a
collaborative, honest type in order to mask that he actually plans to deceive for personal
gain.").
"'0 Paul Rosenberger, Laissez- "Fair": An Argument for the Status Quo Ethical
Constraints on Lawyers, as.Negotiators, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. REsOL. 611, 637 (1998)
("Private negotiation is largely an informal process that goes relatively unregulated in
terms of the ethical duties and constraints imposed upon attorneys."). See, e.g., Mary Jo
Eyster, Clinical Teaching, Ethical Negotiation, and Moral Judgment, 75 NEB. L.REV. 752,
762-63 (1996) ("The structural features of negotiation that make it particularly susceptible
to ethical dilemmas are the following: 1) negotiation is a largely invisible, undocumented,
and unreviewable process; 2) negotiation is a wholly informal process ungoverned by any
codified procedural rules....").
' Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L.
REv. 2005, 2040-42 (1987).
152 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual
Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1 (2000) ("Robert Axelrod's The
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become accepted wisdom that long-term relationships reinforce amicable
interactions and allow negotiators to build trust.'53 As will be detailed in the
following section, the concept that is unique to this essay is that relationships
between negotiators should be structured differently than the relationships
between other advocates.
IV. DEPENDENT ADVOCACY
The analysis thus far has demonstrated that, while advocates in active
litigation must be independent, such independence can be counterproductive
to cooperative interactions like negotiation. The frequency with which people
bring disputes to attorneys and the infrequency with which attorneys bring
disputes to trial indicates that advocacy outside of litigation could be useful.' 54
Guidance from the Prisoner's Dilemma indicates that an ongoing relationship
between advocates would allow them to assist separate disputants under a
trusting, collaborative approach. Applying these lessons by inverting the
independence between advocates that is designed for adversarial litigation, the
resulting new relationship will be referred to below as "dependent
advocacy."' 55
Dependent advocacy is the tempering of competitive incentives through
an ongoing relationship between opposing advocates. Unlike advocates who
must compete aggressively to attract clients and protect these clients against
competitive opponents, advocates with an ongoing relationship would assist
their clients only using behaviors that they would find acceptable for the
opponent to reciprocate back. Though many disputants may choose the
resulting assistance in cooperative communication, the residual ability of
disputants to pursue litigation of legal rights ensures that dependent advocates
Evolution of Cooperation demonstrated (admittedly in an artificially constructed computer
tournament of iterated Prisoner Dilemma games) that a highly cooperative strategy ("tit
for tat"--be nice and only retaliate when someone is bad to you, then quickly forgive) was
robust and more successful than more competitive strategies. This work has led to
applications in biology, politics, and law as researchers seek to understand how cooperative
genes and cooperative behaviors have succeeded in a world posited to be governed
principally by self-interestedness.").
... Mendelsohn, supra note 143, at 163-64 ("On the most basic level, iterated dealings
enable negotiators to get to know one another and build trusting relationships.").
114 The Honorable Garrett Brown, The 2011 Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub Lecture,
65 RUTGERS L. REV. 217, 222 (2012) ("But still, ninety-five percent or more of all federal
cases do not go to trial.... Most clients, and parties, don't share the profession's affection
for a trial-and with good reason.").
155 "Dependent advocacy" is a concept that is being introduced in this article. At the
time of publication, it is strictly theoretical; however, the author would be encouraged to
find it eventually make its way into practice.
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remain loyal to their respective disputants, and do not force collusive
agreements on unwilling participants. A dependent relationship therefore
appears to offer a different flavor of personal assistance in dispute resolution
that may fit certain situations or personal preferences.
Because dependent advocacy has not emerged as an alternative to
independent advocacy in over 800 years'56 this new concept presents a broad
range of questions, from why this relationship has not materialized to what it
would look like if it did. Therefore, the following two subsections will present
valid applications of dependent advocacy and firmly root these proposals in
the history and development of litigation.
A. Negotiation-Based Advocacy
The most obvious application of the dependent advocacy relationship
would be between advocates who focus their assistance on negotiation. Under
this process, disputants would hire experts in communication skills and
bargaining strategies, and these experts would share an ongoing working
relationship.
Ideally, these advocates would work as one unit and be hired as a team,
ensuring that their advocacy would not harm their working relationship or
dispute resolution practice. Though these advocates would share a close
relationship, because their involvement would be limited to voluntary
negotiation, either disputant would be able to terminate both advocates'
involvement if the process seemed unfair. As a result, both negotiation-based
advocates would be under constant incentive to loyally assist their respective
disputants while remaining cooperative in dealing with the opposing side.
Unlike all other forms of negotiation where neither participant can know the
cooperative or competitive intentions of their opponent, each participant in this
process would know that the opposing party: (1) is receiving negotiation
assistance that is hinged on fair and honest dealing, and (2) will benefit from
their respective advocate's professional assistance. Therefore, that it is in the
opponent's best interest to negotiate fairly.
Though this application of dependent advocacy is logical and intuitive,
this approach to dispute resolution was not formulated prior to the proposal of
co-resolution, a dispute resolution process that replaces one impartial mediator
156 Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution,
57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1390-91 (2004) ("By the thirteenth century, several forces caused
the emergence of a professional class of lawyer. Courts became more formal and
concentrated in London, pleadings became more complex, and arguments became
common. As a result, litigants increasingly sought outside assistance, first by friends and
then by professional lawyers....").
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with two partisan conflict coaches who share an ongoing relationship.'57 This
is not to say that the idea of negotiation-based advocacy was never attempted.
In the emerging collaborative law process, attorneys are hired by each side and
then sign a disqualification agreement promising that both will withdraw if the
case proceeds to court. 158 By limiting their assistance to negotiation,
collaborative lawyers are foregoing the basic function and powers of attorneys
and serving, rather, as negotiation-based advocates. Despite this, collaborative
lawyers continue to operate independently, missing the opportunity to build
their services around ongoing relationships that would protect the cooperative
orientation that they strive for.'59 The insight behind these observations is that,
despite its apparent potential, dependent advocacy has not emerged
organically, and this lack of development is described below.
Understanding how independent advocacy materialized without its
dependent counterpart will require an understanding of the origins of legal
assistance. Had advocacy emerged as a primary, stand-alone method of
resolving disputes, then perhaps situations requiring a competitive,
argumentative approach would have gravitated toward independent advocates
while those seeking cooperation would approach dependent advocates.
Instead, however, advocacy developed as a cog within the tribunal or court
system.
160
Courts emerged from the near-universal practice of submitting disputes to
third parties and as a result the advocacy practices that grew out of these
tribunals were thereby limited to adjudication. Across cultures and continents,
members of early societies handled disputes by approaching a mutually
"7 Nathan Witkin, Co-resolution: A Cooperative Structure for Dispute Resolution, 26
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 239, 244 (2008). See, e.g., Malcolm Sher et. al., Other Forms of
Dispute Resolution, 32 GPSOLO 59, 60-61(2015); accord, Nathan Witkin, Mediators as
Cooperative Negotiation Coaches: Initial Applications of Co-Resolution, MAYHEw-HITE
REP. ON DisP. RESOL. & COURTS (Winter 2015), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/epub/mayhew-
hite/2015/03/995/.
... Stu Webb, Collaborative Law: A Practitioner's Perspective on Its History and
Current Practice, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 155, 168 (2008).
159 Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 967, 997 (1999) ("We acknowledge that each of our attorneys
is independent from the other attorneys in the Collaborative Law group, and represents
only one party in our collaborative marital dissolution process."). See, e.g., JONATHAN K.
POLLACK, NEW STRATEGIES AND CONCERNS FOR NEW YORK FAMILY LAW PRACTITIONERS
4 (2014) ("[G]enerally all of the protections provided by in-depth disclosure and
representation by independent counsel are present in collaborative divorce.").
160 See generally JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: CANONISTS, CIVILIANS, AND COURTS (2008) (describing how the legal
professional developed long after the existence of courts).
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respected member of the community for guidance. 6' Using their standing
within the community and experience as problem-solvers, these wise elders
would then combine mediation and arbitration methods to steer the disputants
to a resolution.162 As society became more sophisticated, early courts adopted
these practices, 163 and as courts also became more sophisticated, those who
were knowledgeable about court practices began to offer services as
professional advocates. 164 Thus, advocacy originated as an outgrowth of
adjudication and, as demonstrated above, advocates within an adjudicatory
system must operate independently.
But now that advocacy in dispute resolution has forged both adversarial
and collaborative methodologies, 165 the institution should not remain moored
to the requirements of courtroom procedure. Disputants should be able to
approach cooperative advocates whose ongoing relationship ensures that their
open and honest practices will be compatible. Early success with co-resolution
indicates that such advocates are able to remain both cooperative across the
table and loyal to their respective disputant. 166 And while collaborative law
continues to require each disputant to first approach an independent attorney
and then convince both attorneys to relinquish their role as litigation-based
advocates, this practice has naturally gravitated toward the direction of
161 See Robert Benham & Ansley Boyd Barton, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Ancient Models Provide Modern Inspiration, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 626-33 (1996)
(providing three ancient examples of dispute resolution that indicate that ancient people
took their disputes to a mutually-respected elder who mediated the dispute).
162 Douglas Yam, The Death of ADR: A Cautionary Tale of Isomorphism Through
Institutionalization, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 929, 947 (2004) ("[A]rbitrators were usually
friends, relatives, or at least frequent associates who because of their relationships with the
disputants could apply pressure on them to accept their awards or recognize their claims
as unjust or capable of compromise.").
163 Valerie A. Sanchez, Towards a History of ADR: The Dispute Processing
Continuum in Anglo-Saxon England and Today, 11 OHO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 3 (1996)
("This second cluster of conclusions arises from the finding that legal decisionmakers in
Anglo-Saxon England-judges and arbitrators-often encouraged parties to reach
settlement agreements.... [T]he decisionmakers often changed hats and became third-party
facilitators or mediators, helping the parties to negotiate settlement agreements.").
164 Fischel, supra note 142, at 4 ("In ancient times parties litigants were in the habit of
coming into court and prosecuting or defending their suits in person. Subsequently,
however, as law suits multiplied, and the modes of judicial proceeding became more
complex and formal, it became necessary to have these suits conducted by persons skilled
in the laws and in the practice of the courts. This necessity gave rise, at an early day, to the
class of attorneys.").
165 Compare traditional legal advocacy to collaborative law. See Webb, supra note
76.
166 See Witkin, supra note 157.
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dependent advocacy. Desiring trust and reliable cooperation, collaborative
attorneys tend to work within small networks that facilitate repeat interaction
between opposing advocates.16 7 Expounding on the potential of this idea leads
to the second application of dependent advocacy.
B. Legal Practice Groups
At the outset, not all conflict is clearly diagnosable as needing strictly
litigation-based or negotiation-based intervention. Many disputes are not
amenable to cooperation until one party forces the other into court and, often,
a case that seems to favor the complaining party becomes more convoluted
when the opponent's story is revealed. As a result, many situations require an
advocate to navigate between adjudicated and negotiated decision-making.
6 8
Applying the analysis of previous sections, this mix of orientations indicates
that attorneys would ideally function independently yet also under the
possibility of repeated interactions with opposing counsel. This ongoing
relationship among attorneys would appear to be present in small, contained
legal communities and, conversely, would be absent in larger legal markets.
The resulting balance between obligations to the client in the present matter
and considerations of long-term interaction with opposing counsel, should
allow attorneys to be zealous advocates when necessary but also monitor and
respond to each other's behavior through their reputation among colleagues.
Evidence for the assertion that attorneys operate optimally in limited pools
is found in observations of the practice of law in small towns and trends in
legal professionalism as smaller legal communities diminished. Anecdotal
evidence and pervasive stereotypes have characterized small town legal
practice as friendly, amicable, and far less cut-throat than legal advocacy in
bigger cities.' 69 In support of this distinction, a survey of attorneys practicing
167 See John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of
Lawyer Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1315, 1380-81 (2003) ("Moreover, membership in local CL groups can help
practitioners maintain reputations for acting cooperatively."); Schneyer, supra note 77
("Local practice groups vary in size and structure, but many have fewer than 20
members.... These policies ensure that each member knows the others and their
reputations, and hasten the socialization of new practitioners into the CL culture.").
168 Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Louis D. Brandeis and the Lawyer Advocacy System, 40
PEPP. L. REV. 351, 361 (2013) ("Lawyers, of course, play an advocacy role in negotiation,
as well as in litigation, speaking on behalf of clients.").
169 Jack T. Camp, Thoughts on Professionalism in the Twenty-First Century, 81 TuL.
L. REV. 1377, 1380 n. 12 (2007) ("In areas where the bar is smaller and attorneys andjudges
all know each other, the anonymity that allows unprofessional behavior to thrive is not as
prevalent, and peer pressure and mentoring opportunities help to encourage civility and
professionalism. This has been my experience, having practiced primarily in the small
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in these various settings found that attorneys practicing in communities of
20,000 people or less reported to be 87% more likely to stay in their current
position, compared to 52% percent of attorneys in a metropolitan population
of 250,000.17° Because they had similar income and handled the same types
of cases, the only difference between these groups was the frequency of
interaction among their colleagues.171 The game theory explanation behind
this phenomenon is that the greater likelihood of future interaction between
small-town attorneys carries with it a clear understanding that deceptive or
abrasive behavior will be reciprocated. 72 Overly competitive behavior is
therefore not worth the gains it would potentially garner in individual cases,
and the benefits of developing a reputation for honesty and integrity profit not
only the attorneys but also their clients.
73
town of Newnan, Georgia."); Donald D. Landon, Lasalle Street andMain Street: The Role
of Context in Structuring Law Practice, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 213, 217 (1988) ("There is
some evidence that in smaller settings, where the quality of interaction is more personal
(gemeinschaft), the adversarial dimension of legal work is restrained."); Denice Shepherd
et al., Law at the Boundaries, ARIZ. ATT'Y, May 2001, 36, at 39 ("Shroufe very much
enjoys practicing law in a small town. 'You get to know everyone, and people are
genuinely nice to one another.' She also finds a high level of professionalism among all
attorneys, men and women alike."). The author would also note, after having practiced law
for five years in a city of approximately 35,000 people, that the local Bar is famously
collegial.
170 Landon, supra note 169, at 219-33.
171 Id. at 233-34 ("[R]ural practitioners do seem to be extremely well satisfied in their
professional work. The data suggest that their average income is equivalent to but not
significantly better than the incomes of practitioners in larger settings. Their general
comments indicate they prize their autonomy, their prestige in their smaller communities,
the challenge of their general practice work, and their relationships with their peers.")
(emphasis added); Lisa R. Pruitt & Bradley E. Showman, Law Stretched Thin: Access to
Justice in Rural America, 59 S.D. L. REV. 466, 490 (2014) ("Small-firm practice in the
country isn't really all that different than small-firm practice in the city. The clients have
many of the same problems and you handle a wide variety of matters. The difference is
intimacy.").
172 Douglas H. Yam, The Attorney as Duelist's Friend: Lessons from the Code Duello,
51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 69, 112 (2000) ("Game theory suggests that reputation is more
important in smaller legal communities where lawyers anticipate repeated encounters and
where the actions of individuals can be well publicized.").
173 Id. at 112 n.160 ("Over time, a lawyer's reputation for truthfulness, honesty, and
fairness should make him a more effective negotiator in repeat encounters. As the
profession's size and anonymity increases in an ever-growing society concentrated in large
urban areas, the expectation of repeat encounters diminishes, perhaps explaining the
stereotypes of uncooperative behavior by urban lawyers (the 'Philadelphia attorney')
contrasted to the cooperative behavior of small-town and 'country' lawyers.").
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The relationship between the size of the bar and the collegiality of its
members also presents implications for another important phenomenon: the
overall decline of professionalism in the practice of law. Though it is common
to nostalgically focus on the "good old" aspects when remembering bygone
eras, 174 all observers have noted that attorneys are becoming less harmonious
and more competitive. 175 Over the last 50 years, litigation rates have
increased, 176 attorney job satisfaction rates have declined, 177 and public
174 Joseph Guy Rollins, The Way We Were Fifty Years Ago, Hous. LAW., Sept./Oct.
1995, at 29, 34 ("My first eleven years of practice were in a small town, and I remember
with pleasure and nostalgia the civility and pleasant relationship between lawyers, judges,
and court personnel. Even in Houston courtrooms in the late 1950's there was almost the
same small town friendliness. It is a shame that this has been lost."); Schneyer, supra note
77, at 333 (describing the dynamics "in the small towns of yesteryear, when a handful of
lawyers constantly interacted. But, in today's practice environment.. .lawyers for the
parties in a lawsuit do not know each other or expect to have future dealings").
' Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics of -
Self-Defeat and A Call for A Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the
Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV. 411, 413 (2005) ("Any hardened observer of modem lawyer
regulation cannot avoid the overwhelming sensation of churning. For years now the legal
profession, the judiciary, the academy, and bar associations have decried a 'crisis' in the
profession...."); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Rule of Law(yers) the Practice of Justice: A
Theory of Lawyers' Ethics by William H. Simon, 65 Mo. L. REV. 571, 571 (2000) ("In
recent years, several lawyers and law professors have written books about the decline of
ethical behavior in the legal profession. They have found that lawyers are more adversarial,
less civil, less honest, less concerned with justice, and less happy than in the past."); Hon.
Alva Hugh Maddox, supra note 31, at 334 (Justice Sandra Day O'Connor noted that "[flew
Americans recall the trust that our society once placed in its lawyers" and that she "was
merely stating what many other jurists, lawyers, law professors, and presidents of bar
associations have been talking and writing about over the past three decades.
Unquestionably, there has been a precipitous drop in the public's respect for lawyers during
that period, and very few would dispute that there has also been an admitted decline in
professionalism...."); Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 283, 297 (1998) ("At the most general level, many lawyers express concern about
the 'decline of professionalism.' That phrase captures a range of more specific complaints,
such as increasing commercialism and competition and decreasing civility and
collegiality.").
176 Hedieh Nasheri & David L. Rudolph, Equal Protection Under the Law: Improving
Access to Civil Justice, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 331, 333 (1997) ("Since 1930, the tort
system in the United States has grown four times faster than the economy. Civil suits filed
in federal courts have increased 300% since 1960. In 1991, nearly 19 million new civil
cases were filed in state courts; this amounts to one lawsuit for every ten adults.").
177 Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being A Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an
Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 884 (1999) ("The
decrease in job satisfaction was even more dramatic among those lawyers who were
surveyed in both 1984 and 1990. As noted, 40% of them had been 'very satisfied' and 3%
'very dissatisfied' in 1984. Just six years later, only 29% of these same lawyers (that is,
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perceptions of the legal profession have become more critical. 78 Surveys of
attorneys 179 and members of the public18° report diminished trust, civility, and
ethical behavior between opposing counsel. 181 Because this trend of
increasing animosity between attorneys would intuitively hinder settlement of
cases that are not appropriate for trial, this decline in professionalism seems to
explain the rise of settlement-inducing processes of the alternative dispute
the lawyers who were questioned in both 1984 and 1990) were 'very satisfied,' and the
number who were 'very dissatisfied' had risen to 8%.").
178 Amy E. Black & Stanley Rothman, Shall We Kill All the Lawyers First?: Insider
and Outsider Views of the Legal Profession, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 835, 857-58
(1998) ("Judges and lawyers are both concerned about the impact of the exponential
growth of litigation on society and about public perceptions of the legal profession.
Although members of the American public maintain high regard for judges, the trend of
public perceptions of lawyers reveals a [sic] relatively consistent decline. Many Americans
now seriously question the ethical standards of lawyers, and few [sic] rank the legal
profession as one of high prestige.").
"' Allen K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis-The 'Z' Words and Other Rambo
Tactics: The Conference of ChiefJustices'Solution, 53 S.C.L. REV. 549,552 (2002) ("Carl
M. Selinger, in his article, The Public's Interest in Preserving the Dignity and Unity of the
Legal Profession, agrees: 'This sense of decline is also widespread among practitioners
themselves. For example, 82.7% of respondents to a National Law Journal poll of partners
in the nation's 125 largest law firms agreed that the profession has changed for the worse.'
Among the causes of this crisis is the attitude that the law is less a profession than a mere
competitive business in which its members face ever increasing economic pressures.").
180 Damian L. Halstad, The Tao of Litigation, 19 J. LEGAL PROF. 93, 116 n.9 (1994)
("Surveys of public perception show that the image of lawyers in the public eye has
declined. For example, the American Bar Association reported that in 1973, 24% of
Americans held 'great confidence' in lawyers; by 1993, the level had dropped to 8%.");
Hon. Alva Hugh Maddox, supra note 31, at 324 ("One writer, describing the public's
attitude today, stated that '[w]hat the public doesn't like about lawyers could fill volumes,'
and another writer, discussing the decline in professionalism and the widespread
disaffection for the administration of justice, observed: 'As the 21st century approaches,
many worry that the legal profession is disintegrating into just another cutthroat business,
where the prevailing ethic is kill or be killed."').
181 Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion,
Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 805, 809 (1998) ("In the 1993 NLJ
survey, 36% of the respondents said their image of lawyers had 'gotten worse' and only
8% said it had 'improved."'); Barry Sullivan, Professions of Law, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1235, 1300 n.86 (1996) (citing a report "that lawyers responding to a Seventh Circuit
survey attribute declining civility to increased size of the trial bar, increased competition
among lawyers, and an increasingly strong conception of the law as a business").
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resolution movement,182 the other major development in how law is practiced
during this time.'
83
Unchallenged by any commentators on the subject, this change in the
character of the legal practice must be correlated to a change in a characteristic
of legal practice. One of the most significant developments during this period
of declining cooperation has been the explosive growth in the number of
practicing attorneys. During the 15 years leading up to and encompassing the
introduction of the ADR movement, the number of attorneys in the United
States doubled while the general population increased by 16%,184 and since
1970 the number of attorneys has quadrupled. 185 The negative public opinion
and litigiousness of attorneys therefore appears to coincide with their
disproportionate multiplication within society.
18 6
182 Bruce M. Price, Halting, Altering and Agreeing, 38 S.U.L. REV. 233, 246 (2011)
("Christine Harrington traces the rise of the modem ADR movement within the American
judiciary in the early 1970s to neighborhood justice centers designed to handle minor
interpersonal disputes."); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration: Innovation and
Evolution in the United States Construction Industry, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 65, 67-68
(1996) (noting the rise in alternative dispute resolution and relating it to the decline in
overall feelings of community and social connectedness).
183 Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 956 (2000) ("[T]he
rise of the ADR movement at the end of the twentieth century has created, perhaps
inadvertently, a unified system of public civil justice in which trial, arbitration, mediation,
evaluative techniques, and other forms of ADR all operate toward the single end of binding
public civil dispute resolution.").
" Goldberg, supra note 69, at 228 ("The number of lawyers in the United States
nearly doubled from 355,000 in 1969 to 649,000 in 1984."); "...in the Spirit of Public
Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, AM. BAR ASS'N 4
(1986) ("In 1960, there was approximately one lawyer for every 627 of the nation's
citizens. By 1985, there was one for every 354 citizens."); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 20
T
CENTURY STATISTICS 868 (1999),
https://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/99statab/sec31.pdf (reporting that the overall
population in the United States grew from 205,052,000 in 1970 to 238,466,00 in 1985, a
growth of 16%).
185 Thomas D. Morgan, The Changing Face of Legal Education: Its Impact on What
It Means to Be a Lawyer, 45 AKRON L. REV. 811, 813 (2012) ("First, over the last forty
years, the American bar has grown more rapidly and changed more profoundly than in any
comparable-length period in history.... [T]he legal profession has roughly
quadrupled-from about 300,000 in 1970 to about 1,200,000 lawyers today....").
186 Galanter, supra note 181, at 810 ("Most Americans believe that there are too many
lawyers, that they have 'too much influence and power in society,' that they file too many
lawsuits, and that these lawsuits hamper the U.S. economy.").
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Again, the Prisoner's Dilemma dynamics of single-shot compared to
iterated interactions, introduced above, 8 7 provides a causal link between these
phenomena. As the propagation of attorneys outpaced general population
growth, repeated interaction between attorneys decreased. "8 With little
chance of representing different clients against each other in future cases,
attorneys experienced difficulty developing and signaling a reputation for
honest, cooperative behavior.'89 So, under greater pressures to compete for
business, 9 ° these attorneys had no reason to moderate their efforts to impress
the clients with an interest in maintaining collegiality with opposing
counsel.' 91 As a result, deceptive behavior went unpunished, an ethic of
unrestrained competition became commonplace, and attorneys had to fight fire
with fire to stay in business. 92 Evidence that the diminishing civility in the
legal community is the product of its growing size, and not the result of
competition compounding over time in an adversarial field, is seen in the
difference between small-town and big-city practice that is alive today. As
one commentator noted, "[w]hile small-town lawyers in remote and bucolic
corners of the country may continue to treat each other with some degree of
professional courtesy, that there is a problem in most of the more populous
187 See supra Section I1.A.
188 Peppet, supra note 149, at 487 ("As the profession has expanded exponentially
over the last decades, it has become increasingly common for attorneys within a firm not
to know each other, let alone attorneys city-, nation-, or world-wide.").
89 Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Cooperation and Conflict Between
Litigators, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 125, 126 (1994) ("The increase in size
of the legal community makes it difficult for a lawyer to have sufficient dealings with a
large enough segment of the bar to develop a reputation for cooperation.... Conflict in
litigation increases."); Peppet, supra note 149, at 478 ("If two negotiating parties can signal
credibly a commitment to collaborate, they increase the odds of reaching a satisfactory
negotiated outcome. But clients are often strangers, and lawyers today practice in a large
and increasingly diverse bar that is spread across the globe.").
"9 Brae Canlen, Injured? Call Now! California Tries to Get Tough with TV
Attorneys--and Touches Off a Class War in the Bar, 15 CAL. LAW. 48, 90 (1995) ("As the
number of new lawyers increases and the competition for business intensifies, attorneys
will continue to move in the direction of car dealers, cereal companies, and breweries.").
' Cindy Ching, Focus on Member Service, HAW. B.J., January 1999, at 4 ("With less
interaction between members of the bar and a decrease in collegiality, dealings become
more impersonal and more adversarial. It is much easier to be unreasonable to opposing
counsel if the relationship is impersonal and you do not know them personally.").
192 Harris, supra note 179, at 561 ("The dramatic increase in the number of lawyers in
America (now numbering in excess of one million) as well as lawyer advertising and




places where law is practiced seems undeniable."' 93 Thus, the growing size of
the legal community prevents attorneys from being able to develop reputations
for good or bad behavior among their peers and weakens incentives for fair
dealing that manifest when attorneys expect to work against each other in the
future.
The practical implication of these observations is that small-town
collegiality can be recreated by limiting the number of attorneys that work
against each other on a regular basis. The simple, feasible, and effective
application of this lesson is the legal practice group. Creating the legal practice
group is as easy as selecting a group of mutually respected attorneys and
collectively signaling membership to the public. Unlike small-town attorneys,
members are not forced to work in these limited circles; but also unlike small-
town attorneys, their membership may be terminated for acting contrary to the
standards of the group. To the degree that clients choose members as opposing
counsel, these attorneys will interact more frequently, replicating the
incentives and reputational market among adversaries that exists in smaller
legal communities. Because the operation of these practice groups offer
benefits to clients and attorneys alike, the incentives to maintain stellar
reputations should counteract pressures to lie, cheat, and steal in the interests
of protecting the client.
The potential benefits of legal practice groups presents strong motivation
for wholehearted participation in their collegial atmosphere. The most
important benefit of hiring attorneys within the same practice group is the
promise of a fair, cooperative opponent. Instead of counterbalancing the
dangers of an unpredictable opponent by hiring a combative attorney, clients
can avoid these dangers entirely by hiring an attorney that works in the
opposing attorney's practice group. Furthermore, using attorneys that have a
stake in their ongoing interaction would reduce stress and legal expense for
the clients by curbing unproductive litigiousness. Of even greater import,
because individual disputants who approach attorneys seem to desire fairness,
respect, and empathy over maximum gains and optimal outcomes, the promise
of a fair process would appear to be attractive to people with legal needs.'
94
19' Roger E. Schechter, Changing Law Schools to Make Less Nasty Lawyers, 10 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 367, 380 (1997) (discussing the "civility crisis").
... Kristin B. Gerdy, Clients, Empathy, and Compassion: Introducing First-Year
Students to the "Heart" of Lawyering, 87 NEB. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (in describing surveys
of clients, "both the adults and children interviewed focused less on the lawyers' legal
knowledge and expertise and more on 'the interpersonal skills and behaviors of the
lawyers.'... Further, the clients interviewed 'unmistakably emphasized being treated with
respect'... their satisfaction had less to do with their lawyers' 'conventional advocacy skills
[or] the outcome of their case,' but instead was directly related to their assessment of the
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This demand for a fair opponent and respectful interactions between
attorneys will drive appropriate cases to self-select into legal practice groups.
By hiring an attorney who is a member of a legal practice group, the
complaining party gives the opponent the choice between an amicable legal
process through hiring another member of the same practice group and
unrestrained litigation through hiring an attorney who is unfamiliar with
plaintiff's counsel. Both clients therefore exercise choice over the character
of their legal representation, allowing cases appropriate for collegial
interaction to self-select into this process. And while underuse of collaborative
law indicates problems with an intake process that requires both disputants to
agree to cooperative representation at the outset and forego the possibility of
litigation, 195 legal practice groups do not require coordinated action by
opposing interests and expand rather than limit the clients' choices by giving
each control over the type of advocacy employed.'96 The second result of the
potential client demand for practice group representation is that it will
motivate attorneys selected, because of their practice group membership, to
value and protect their relationships with other members.
Though attorneys presumptively benefit when their services benefit
clients, the concept of the legal practice group presents particular motivation
relationship they had with their lawyers. Respondents spoke favorably of lawyers who gave
'expressions of respect, caring and emotional involvement with the client's case').
195 J. Herbie DiFonzo, A Vision for Collaborative Practice: The Final Report of the
Hofstra Collaborative Law Conference, 38 HOFSTRA L. REv. 569, 603-04 (2009) ("[O]ne
major disappointment to date has been the steep financial entry cost into collaborative
law.... At present, the collaborative process is largely limited to the wealthiest segment of
American families."). This economic barrier seems to be contradicted by the promise of
reduced legal expenses. See Susan Daicoff, Collaborative Law: A New Tool for the
Lawyer's Toolkit, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 113, 141-42 (2009) ("[I]n light of very
recent economic downturns, collaborative law may become even more attractive because
it can minimize the amount of client wealth spent on legal fees, thus making more money
available for family purposes.")
"' Lynn Mather, What Do Clients Want? What Do Lawyers Do?, 52 EMORY L.J. 1065,
1075 (2003) ("[L]awyers see themselves as in charge of the case. They take the view that,
as one attorney put it, they are 'expensive taxi drivers' in which 'the passenger decides on
the destination and I decide on the route."'). Currently when litigation is initiated, both
sides are forced into a zealously adversarial form of advocacy. See Judith L. Maute,
Sporting Theory of Justice: Taming Adversary Zeal with A Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20
Conn. L. Rev. 7, 33 (1987) ("The win-lose adversary game creates a dilemma: Justice is
presumably on one side only, but each player must fight hard, 'using all the tricks of the
trade, as long as the rules are obeyed."'); Daniel Bent, Game Theory Explains How
Mediation Can Trump Litigation, HAW. B.J., June 2003, at 6, 9 ("It is remarkable how
much can be stirred up in the normal process of litigation.... This happens in litigation
alone often enough to keep the memory of the mythical Pandora alive.").
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for attorneys to form and maintain such associations. By offering services in
exclusive practice groups, attorneys can promise both full legal representation
and a collegial opponent. Economically, presenting clients with a choice
between advocacy styles is inherently attractive to consumers, as it allows the
attorneys to expand services to a wider base of customers and permits the
attorneys to differentiate the cost of their services based on the type of
advocacy (e.g., requesting lower retainers for cases handled within the practice
group).' 97 Furthermore, practice group membership allows plaintiff's counsel
to offer services under the optimal game theory strategy of conditional
cooperation (able to litigate amicably if the defendant hires from within the
practice group and aggressively if the defendant does not) and allows
defendant's counsel to attract clients who prefer respectful litigation over an
aggressive battle.198 Beyond offering the possibility of an amicably litigated
case, membership in an elite and well-respected practice group would signal
that an attorney is respected among colleagues and individual successes within
a practice group will promote business for all members. 9 9 Finally, increased
respect among practice group members will equate to less stress and greater
satisfaction in their professional interactions. °0
Compared to the benefits for clients and attorneys, the costs and efforts
required to implement the concept of the legal practice group are miniscule.
Because attorneys already differentiate themselves along a continuum from
civil to aggressive,2' offering services in legal practice groups only requires
197 Jon Leibowitz, The United States Federal Trade Commission: Continuity and -
Challenges, 5 COMPETITION L. INT'L 8 (2009) ("Competition gives suppliers the incentive
to offer consumers the most attractive array of choices in terms of price, quality, and other
aspects of customer satisfaction."); Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of the
Professional World: They Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the
Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1108 (2000) ("[W]hen asked whether they prefer
more choices, consumers will always say yes.").
198 Scott, supra note 151, at 2029 ("A party committed to a policy of conditional
cooperation retaliates, but returns to a cooperative response at the next opportunity."); id.
at 2032 ("A reputation for adhering to conditional cooperation offers the best chance of
overcoming the threat imposed by inadequate information.").
199 William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging
Practice, 4 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 399 n.67 (2004) ("In addition to finding 'like-
minded' colleagues, CL groups are used for marketing the model and continuing training
for their members.").
200 Dwight E. Baker, Collegiality Reduces Stress, 51 ADVOC. 6 (2008) ("Collegiality
reduces stress. If our relationship with opposing counsel is built on a collegial foundation,
our relationship with our clients can take on a different aura. We can begin to approach our
clients about issues on a problem-solving basis, rather than as a win/lose contest.").
21 David R. Barnhizer, The Purposes and Methods ofAmerican Legal Education, 36
J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 76 n.91 (2011) (citing Kim Isaac Eisler, The Truth About Divorce
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that attorneys draw attention to this distinction and monitor each other through
the normal course of representing adverse interests. Placing a label on these
distinctions will allow consumers and producers of legal services to sort
collegial attorneys and cases from combative ones, effectively combating the
Prisoner's Dilemma when desired with strong reputational markets.
202
Further solidifying the potential benefits of this hypothetical model, legal
practice groups are already being applied with success in the context of
collaborative law.2 3 Because the collaborative law process shackles attorneys
to informal negotiation and precludes the court from intervening to uncover
deception, collaborative attorneys have naturally sought the protection of
repeated interaction by gravitating into limited groups. 2 4 The distinction
Lawyers: It's Hard to Find Lawyers Both Civilized and Fair to Clients Who Need a
Divorce. Here's Why, The Washingtonian, Oct. 1995 at 128: "In describing Washington's
top divorce lawyers, the survey identified forty lawyers considered to be the best at
handling a divorce in an effective but civilized manner. It also described ten, ones labeled
'bombers' regarded as the best at what they do and stating that: 'What these ten others
often do is torment the spouses of their clients. They sometimes are referred to as
"bombers" or "sharks"'. She adds: 'Although contentious, the ten divorce lawyers known
as bombers are as admired by their clients, the evidence suggests, as they are disliked, or
feared, by peaceminded attorneys."').
202 Peppet, supra note 149, at 482 ("Deception only works if undetected, however, and
therefore deceivers try to appear trustworthy and forthright. In game-theoretic terms, such
second-level deception (i.e., deception about deception) creates a sorting or signaling
problem. A negotiator must try to determine the 'type' of her counterpart-is the
counterpart an honest, collaborative type or a more hard-bargaining, deceptive type?");
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 512-13 (1994) ("We
suggest that, in contrast to clients who are unlikely to litigate against one another ever
again, lawyers are repeat players who have the opportunity to establish reputations.").
203 Judge Tommy Bryan, Saying "No" to Court? An Introduction to the Collaborative-
Law Process, 70 ALA. LAW. 434 (2009) ("As of 2008, there were more than 150
collaborative-law practice groups in the United States."). See also Dafna Lavi, Can the
Leopard Change His Spots?! Reflections on the 'Collaborative Law' Revolution and
Collaborative Advocacy, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 61, 79-83 (2011).
204 Schwab, supra note 199, at 362 ("Practice groups continue to be the organizational
unit of CL for a variety of reasons, but primarily because these groups make it easier to
find colleagues who can be trusted to negotiate collaboratively."); Lande, supra note 167,
at 1380-81 ("Moreover, membership in local CL groups can help practitioners maintain
reputations for acting cooperatively."); POLLACK, supra note 159, at 4 ("Collaborative
lawyers typically attend regular monthly meetings with other collaborative lawyers to
share developments in the field, troubleshoot issues, and generally compare notes.");
Schneyer, supra note 77, at 330 ("Local practice groups vary in size and structure, but
many have fewer than 20 members. Some are quite selective in admitting members and
insist on active participation in association activities" and "[t]hese policies ensure that each
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proposed in this section is that attorneys be able to organize into practice
groups without foregoing the possibility of litigation.
As to the ethicality of legal practice groups, nothing in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct prevents attorneys from joining informal
organizations." 5 In fact, legal ethical rules originated from the local, informal
bar associations2 6 that boast a long history of fostering a sense of community
among attorneys.20 7 Ethics decisions indicate that attorneys can identify
practice groups within a firm with labels such as "Institute. 20 8 Practice groups
may even reinforce ethical behavior,20 9 and one commentator proposed that
member knows the others and their reputations, and hasten the socialization of new
practitioners into the CL culture.").
205 In considering an antitrust claim against minimum fee schedules for attorneys in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, Chief Justice Burger noted that "forms of competition usual.
in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession."
Goldberg, supra note 69, at 255-56.
206 Chris G. McDonough & Michael L. Epstein, Regulating Attorney Conduct:
Specific Statutory Schemes v. General Regulatory Guidelines, I I TOURO L. REV. 609, 610
(1995) ("The adolescence of the modem Code was spent as The ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics, first adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908."); Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1249 (1991) ("In
authorship, the Canons were fraternal admonitions, promulgated neither by the legislature
nor the courts, but by the bar itself."); Barton, supra note 175, at 426 ("The early focus on
legal ethics began in legal academia and was promulgated by bar associations. In the last
third of the nineteenth century, organized bar associations rose to prominence as city bar
associations and later as state and national associations.").
207 Denise Scofield, A Legacy of Professionalism, HouS. LAW., Nov./Dec. 2011, at 6
("[P]articipating in the social and professional activities offered by the HBA and other
local bar associations fosters that sense of smallness-of community, collegiality, and
respect."); Richard H. Kyle Jr., Social Skills Practice, BENCH & B. MINN., Feb. 2015, at 7
("[M]y belief [is] that one of the primary reasons lawyers join bar associations is the
increased sense of community they provide. In our ever more fragmented legal profession
lawyers want to connect with, and support, one another."); Cornelius D. Helfrich, The Solo
Perspective from MSBA's Top Leader, 37 MD. B.J. 42, 45 (2004) ("This is true also for all
of our Sections and Committees. They work hard for our members. They are the work
horses of MSBA and the essence of Bar Association participants. They create a real sense
of community among attorneys from diverse geographical areas and facilitate the effective
delivery of legal services to our clients.").
208 Ethics Digest, 30 PA. LAW. 54 (2008) ("Inquirer questioned the ethical propriety
of designating a lawyers' practice group within the firm that would focus its professional
work on educational and school-related matters. In particular, inquirer contemplated
calling the practice group a name that would include the word 'Institute,' such as
'Education Law Institute."' After citing various rules, "inquirer was advised that the use
of a name that includes 'Institute' would be ethically permissible.").
209 Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Stemlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1107, 1165 (2013) ("The ethical culture of a firm, company, agency, or practice
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attorneys be required to join practice groups of no more than a dozen members
to discuss ethical quandaries.21 ° Furthermore, many of the ethical rules
guiding modern attorneys were designed during a time when legal
communities were small and repeated interactions restrained overly
competitive behavior.211 In addressing small, tight-knit legal communities,
these rules were designed to prevent attorneys from valuing professional
relationships with judges and opposing counsel over duties to the client.212
This focus on limiting loyalties among professionals is misplaced in the
current legal market, where economic forces naturally drive attorneys to
prioritize the relationship with the client over all other considerations. So,
instead of being a product of changing preferences about advocacy, when the
ABA modified its model ethical guidelines to remove the emphasis on zealous
advocacy 213 it was because of the cooperation-competition shift that
group is an important determinant of how ethically the attorneys within that entity will
behave.").
210 Burnele V. Powell, Creating Space for Lawyers to Be Ethical: Driving Towards
an Ethic of Transparency, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1123 (2006) ("As another possibility,
we might require that all lawyers be part of practice groups (that is to say, groups of
anywhere from a half dozen to a dozen attorneys). The quid pro quo for being part of a
practice group would be that lawyers could raise the fact that ethical issues had, first, been
referred to a group as a mitigating factor in connection with any subsequent charge of
ethical misconduct or malpractice.").
211 McDonough & Epstein, supra note 206, at 609-10 (Noting that legal ethic's
"infancy was a series of ideas developed as lectures by Judge George Sharswood which
were published as Professional Ethics in 1854. The ideas expressed in those lectures
prompted the creation of the Alabama Code of Ethics in 1887; the first attorney ethics
regulatory scheme in the country.").
212 Bruce A. Hake, Dual Representation in Immigration Practice: The Simple Solution
Is the Wrong Solution, 5 GEO. 1MMIGR. L.J. 581, 611-12 (1991) ("After giving due respect
to a lawyer's duties to the administration of justice, the legal ethics rules all boil down to
the duty of loyalty to the client."); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR
ASS'N, amended 2014) ("A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an
opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client
and at the same time assume that justice is being done."); Hazard, Jr., supra note 206, at
1249-50 ("Two notable nineteenth-century formulations of the legal profession's ethical
principles were written by David Hoffman and George Sharswood... As to the duty owed
the client, Sharswood advised: 'Entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability--these are the higher points, which can only satisfy the truly conscientious
practitioner."').
213 Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 116, 190 n.9 (1990) (reviewing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY (1988)) ("According to Canon 7 of the Model Code, for example, a 'lawyer should
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accompanied changing demographics from uniformly small, congenial legal
communities214 to mostly large, impersonal ones. 215  Bolstering this link
between the growing size of legal communities and the approach adopted by
ethical rules, Alabama continued its role as pioneer of American legal ethics
and possibly signaled a shift toward promoting courtesy between attorneys by
issuing an aspirational code stating that a "lawyer should maintain a cordial
and respectful relationship with opposing counsel., 216 Thus, not only are legal
practice groups ethical, but they recreate an atmosphere around which the rules
were originally designed.
Legal practice groups are therefore a simple and effective mechanism that
would allow attorneys and clients to counteract the Prisoner's Dilemma effects
of large legal communities in appropriate cases.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The central proposal of this paper is an alternative to independent
advocacy. Prior to the introduction of dispute resolution processes managed
strictly by the advocates, advocacy was an element within the adjudication
system. By focusing on negotiation, ADR processes such as collaborative law,
conflict coaching, and co-resolution have effectively detached advocacy from
represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.' The Model Rules remove some
of the Code's emphasis on zealousness, but the Comment to Rule 1.3 still declares, in part,
that a 'lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."'); David Simon Sokolow, From Kurosawa
to (Duncan) Kennedy: The Lessons of Rashomon for Current Legal Education, 1991 Wis.
L. REv. 969, 987 n.33 (1991) ("The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by the
ABA in 1983 and amended in 1990, have replaced the 'zealous representation' requirement
of Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1980) with the requirement that
"[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.").
214 Barton, supra note 175, at 426 ("In the earliest days of American lawyers there was
little consideration of 'legal ethics' as a distinct entity. The ethical and moral obligations
of lawyers derived largely from religious principles, and lawyer conduct was regulated
through the natural peer pressure of a small, homogenous group....").
215 Harris, supra note 179, at 553 ("Thoughtful members of the bar and some members
of the bench.. .are... quick to suggest that wrongdoing within the profession is increasing
and is going unpunished, as overburdened courthouses become, like society itself, large
and impersonal.").
216 Keith B. Norman, The Image of the Legal Profession and the Weather, 71 ALA.
LAW. 13, 14 (2010) ("In April 1992, the Alabama Board of Bar Commissioners adopted
the Alabama State Bar Code of Professional Courtesy, and the Alabama State Bar
Lawyer's Creed to guide all lawyers in their comportment and treatment of fellow lawyers
and the judiciary. The Code has since been incorporated into the Alabama Pledge of
Professionalism. Although aspirational, the Code and Creed are both bedrock tenets of
professionalism.").
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litigation. Such cooperative, negotiation-based processes will need advocates
that are designed for the inherently cooperative process of negotiation and not
adversarial battle in front of a powerful third-party decision-maker.
An analysis of the design and function of independent advocates indicates
that the structure of their relationship is not conducive to cooperation. Dispute
resolution processes that apply law and outside judgment to resolve disputes
function optimally when opposing advocates are motivated to fully argue their
cases and they function unfairly when the outcome is produced by an
overarching loyalty between the advocates. As a result, ethical rules
governing professionals who assist in the application of state enforcement of
social norms through binding law should focus practitioners on client loyalty
through independence. Furthermore, the process of applying binding law
requires that each advocate function separately and zealously represent their
respective viewpoints. The combination of these insights is that, by operating
in a forum in which a powerful decision-maker applies binding law, advocates
in litigation must be independent from their adversaries.
While an independent relationship between opposing advocates was
designed to foster competition in adversarial adjudication, a limited or
fractured relationship is unnecessary and may be counterproductive to
advocates in a cooperative context. Game theory, experiences from
negotiation, and common sense support the assertion that an ongoing
relationship between advocates will incentivize cooperation through the threat
of reciprocating unfair behavior and the promise of repeated, mutually
beneficial outcomes. And because disputants retain the ability to walk away
from a negotiation-based process, unlike advocates who deal with binding law,
advocates who are empowered solely by both disputants' continued buy-in are
operating under constant motivation to loyally assist their respective
disputants. Thus, an ongoing relationship between opposing advocates
appears to be better designed for cooperative, negotiation-based advocacy
processes.
The revelation that cooperation is facilitated by a more dependent
relationship between advocates has two immediately apparent applications.
First, advocates who limit their assistance to negotiation, such as collaborative
lawyers, should share an ongoing relationship rather than function
independently. This lesson was instrumental in the development of co-
resolution, an ADR process in which two conflict coaches directly assist
opposing parties while operating as partners in one dispute resolution service.
The second application involves the increase in competition (and resulting
decline in professionalism) that occurred when expanding populations of
attorneys decreased the likelihood of repeated interaction between opposing
counsel. To counteract this trend, attorneys could offer services as part of
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exclusive legal practice groups. By advertising services in small groups that
are familiar with each other, attorneys provide the parties with the opportunity
to choose a more cooperative relationship between their advocates. The power
of an ongoing relationship embodied in the concept of dependent advocacy
thereby presents various opportunities for dispute resolution advocates to offer
cooperation-based services.
Cooperation amongst advocates promises better designed services for
negotiation-based advocacy and for clients with important legal rights who,
nevertheless, desire to have an amicably litigated resolution to their disputes.
Ideally, disputants would continue to seek evaluation of their legal rights
through independent counsel, but would use dependent counsel to negotiate
their particular preferences within this framework. Without the availability of
dependent advocacy, attorneys and conflict coaches will continue to structure
collaborative services around dynamics intended to promote competition in an
adversarial forum.
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